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HOW PUBLIC PENSION PLANS HAVE SHAPED PRIVATE
EQUITY
WILLIAM W. CLAYTON*
Private equity is one of the most important asset classes in the global
investment marketplace. The rise of private equity over the past two decades
has been fueled in significant part by public pension plans. Historically,
these institutions avoided alternative investments, but today public pension
plans are collectively the largest investors in private equity funds.
In this Article, I identify several ways in which public pension plans
have shaped the modern private equity industry, using the SEC’s three-part
mission as an analytical framework. First, public pension plans have
complicated the orderliness and efficiency of private equity contracting by
introducing several distinctive non-market incentives and requirements to
the industry. Second, large-scale investment in private equity by public plans
has also increased the number of ordinary people who are impacted by
private equity fund performance. Over the years, the SEC has repeatedly
pointed to public pension plans—which manage the retirement assets of
teachers, firefighters, and other public servants—as an investor protectionbased justification for its expanded regulatory presence in private equity.
Third, the massive flow of public pension capital to private equity over the
years has also had important implications for capital formation dynamics
and the distribution of bargaining power in the private equity industry.
For all these reasons, private equity is far more public than is commonly
understood. Even though private equity funds are considered “private
funds” under the federal securities laws, public pension plans have left a
deep imprint on how the industry operates, and the industry’s operations
have enormous consequences for the fiscal health of states and localities
across the country.
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and Securities Litigation Summer Workshop Series for helpful comments and discussions on an
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INTRODUCTION
Private equity’s biggest backers are public pension plans. Sometimes
held up as an elite private contracting setting,1 the $4.5 trillion private equity
industry2 is actually funded in significant part by capital that comes from
public retirement funds. Historically, public pension plans invested nearly
all their capital in traditional stocks and bonds,3 but they have collectively
become the largest investors in the modern private equity fund industry.4
Public plans’ pace of investment in private equity has only accelerated since
the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic.5
This Article identifies several ways in which public pension plan
investment has shaped the modern private equity industry. For an analytical
framework, I use the Security and Exchange Commission (“SEC”)’s threepart mission to (1) protect investors, (2) promote capital formation, (3) and
maintain fair, orderly, and efficient capital markets.6 I argue that even though
private equity funds are considered “private funds” under the federal
securities laws, the enormous presence of public pension plans has both
1. See, e.g., Peter Morris & Ludovic Phalippou, A New Approach to Regulating Private
Equity, 12 J. CORP. L. STUD. 59, 68 (2012) (“The generally accepted view of private equity is that
it is a highly competitive market involving sophisticated players. Most observers deem it de facto
efficient, such that the relationship between managers and investors requires no attention.”); Larry
E. Ribstein, Partnership Governance of Large Firms, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 289, 298 (2009) (“Privateequity buyout firms provide a leading example of the use of partnership mechanisms in governing
large firms.”).
2. The size of the market is over $7 trillion if you count other private market asset classes
including private debt, real estate, and infrastructure. See MCKINSEY & CO., A YEAR OF
DISRUPTION IN THE PRIVATE MARKETS: 2021 MCKINSEY GLOBAL PRIVATE MARKETS REVIEW 11
(2021),
https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/industries/private%20equity%20and%20principal
%20investors/our%20insights/mckinseys%20private%20markets%20annual%20review/2021/mck
insey-global-private-markets-review-2021-v3.pdf.
3. See infra Section II.A.
4. See PREQIN, 2020 PREQIN GLOBAL PRIVATE EQUITY AND VENTURE CAPITAL REPORT 40
(2020) (showing that public pension plans are the largest investors in private equity funds,
representing 35% of all capital in the asset class).
5. See Heather Gillers, Retirement Funds Bet Bigger on Private Equity, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 10,
2022, 5:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/retirement-funds-bet-bigger-on-private-equity11641810604 (“Government retirement funds are pumping record sums into private equity, defying
concerns about risk and cost as they try to plug pension shortfalls. U.S. pension funds’ privateequity investments swelled to an average 8.9% of holdings in 2021 after three years of straight
growth . . . .”).
6. See
The
Role
of
the
SEC,
U.S.
SEC.
&
EXCH.
COMM’N,
https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/investing-basics/rolesec#:~:text=The%20U.%20S.%20Securities%20and%20Exchange,Facilitate%20capital%20forma
tion (last visited Mar. 11, 2022) (‘The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission . . . has a threepart mission: Protect investors . . . [m]aintain fair, orderly and efficient markets . . . [and] [f]acilitate
capital formation.”).
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shaped how this industry operates and also increased the public’s interest in
what happens in this market.7 Thus, while one can argue about whether the
past and proposed8 SEC interventions in this market are well-conceived or
within the agency’s legal authority, the SEC’s growing interest in private
equity over the years is not particularly surprising.
I argue first that the massive presence of public pension plans in the
industry has complicated the orderliness and efficiency of private equity
contracting.9
Public pension plans introduce several non-market
requirements and incentives to the private equity contracting process. For
example, as government entities, state and local pension plans are commonly
subject to various standing prescriptive policies and regulatory
requirements10 mandating that they receive certain terms. This adds
complexity and cost to the private equity negotiating process and reduces
contracting flexibility and adaptability. Moreover, even setting aside formal
policies and regulations that prescribe public pension bargaining behavior,
the staff members and trustees at public pension plans are also likely to have
elevated concerns about “headline risk” and other non-market factors that can
affect their bargaining priorities. The state and local officials behind these
plans also tend to be more insulated from market forces than other types of
institutional investors. For these and other reasons, the private equity
industry cannot simply be viewed as a pure private market setting where all
participants are perfectly rational contracting parties.
Second, I argue that the rise of public pension investment in private
equity has affected the investor protection calculus in the industry by
increasing the number of ordinary people who are impacted by fund
operations.11 State and local pension plans invest the retirement savings of
public servants across the nation, including teachers, firefighters, and
policemen, and they are typically backed by the taxpayers in the relevant
jurisdiction sponsoring the public plan.12 Concerns for these underlying
stakeholders have been amplified by a history of pension underfunding
7. While foreign public pension plans and sovereign wealth funds also play an important role
in the private equity ecosystem, this Article’s analysis focuses primarily on the effect of state and
local pension plans located in the United States.
8. Gary Gensler’s tenure as SEC Chair has marked a remarkable new chapter in the SEC’s
regulatory interest in private equity, as evidenced by recently proposed rules that would dramatically
increase mandatory disclosure in the industry and introduce other regulatory interventions. See
infra Section VI.A.1.
9. See infra Part III.
10. Moreover, plans are overseen by legislative bodies that can respond to market developments
by passing mandatory laws and policies. See infra note 91 and accompanying text.
11. See infra Part IV.
12. See KATELIN P. ISAACS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., 98-810, FEDERAL EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT
SYSTEM: BENEFITS AND FINANCING 11 (2015).

844

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 81:840

problems in state and local governments13 and academic studies documenting
problematic investment management practices by public pension investment
staffs.14
A review of the SEC’s rhetoric over the years confirms that these
concerns have in fact played a role in shaping the SEC’s approach to private
equity. In response to questions about why the SEC had dramatically
expanded its private equity examination program and brought enforcement
actions against private equity fund managers in the mid-2010s, the SEC
repeatedly invoked the massive presence of public pension plans in the
industry and the potential for negative effects on pension beneficiaries and
taxpayers.15 More recently, throughout his tenure Chair Gary Gensler has
raised familiar concerns about industry practices and has similarly referenced
public pension plans as justification for additional regulatory interventions.16
In February 2022, this language turned to action when the SEC released a
groundbreaking rulemaking proposal that, if adopted, would dramatically

13. See infra Section IV.A.2.
14. See infra notes 120–126 and accompanying text.
15. See, e.g., Andrew J. Bowden, Dir., Off. of Compliance Inspections & Examinations, U.S.
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Address at the Private Equity International Private Fund Compliance Forum:
Spreading Sunshine in Private Equity (May 6, 2014) (transcript available at
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2014--spch05062014ab.html) (“Why is [Office of Compliance
Inspections & Examinations (“OCIE”)] spending resources on private funds? . . . Why not devote
more resources to helping ‘mom and pop’ investors? . . . To the extent private equity advisers are
engaged in improper conduct, it adversely affects the retirement savings of teachers, firemen, police
officers, and other workers across the U.S.”); Andrew Ceresney, Dir., Div. of Enf’t, U.S. Sec. &
Exch. Comm’n, Address at the Securities Enforcement Forum West: Private Equity Enforcement
(May 12, 2016), (transcript available at https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/private-equityenforcement.html) (“[W]hy is the SEC spending its limited resources on the private equity industry
given the sophistication of most investors? Because it is important to understand that retail investors
are significantly invested in private equity. For example, public pension plans frequently invest the
retirement savings of their plan beneficiaries — which include teachers, police officers and
firefighters — in private equity funds. . . . So, if an adviser defrauds a private equity fund, the
underlying victims frequently include retail investors, who in many cases are not in a position to
protect themselves.”).
16. See, e.g., Gary Gensler, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Testimony Before the United
States House of Representatives Committee on Financial Services (Oct. 5, 2021) (transcript
available at https://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/gensler-2021-10-05) (“I believe we can enhance
disclosures in this area, better enabling pensions and others investing in these private funds to get
the information they need to make investment decisions. Ultimately, every pension fund investing
in these private funds would benefit if there were greater transparency and competition in this
space.”); Gary Gensler, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Prepared Remarks at the Institutional
Limited Partners Association Summit (Nov. 10, 2021) (transcript available at
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/gensler-ilpa-20211110#_ftn12) [hereinafter Gensler, Remarks at
ILPA Summit] (“[Increased transparency] could raise the returns for the pensions and endowments
behind the limited partner investors. This ultimately could help workers preparing for retirement
and families paying for their college educations.”).
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increase regulatory intervention in the market.17 Following that release, all
three SEC commissioners who supported the proposal issued statements that
referenced public pension plans as a motivating force behind their support.18
A reference to public plans also features prominently in the proposal itself.19
Finally, the rise of public pension investment in private equity has also
contributed to enormous institutional demand for private equity fund
products over the years.20 As private equity managers have enjoyed
extraordinary success in increasing assets under management over the past
decade, institutional investors have frequently complained about an
imbalance in bargaining power21 that leads to manager-favorable governance
terms in private equity funds.22 Interestingly, a large body of research
17. See infra Section VI.A.1.
18. Gary Gensler, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement on Private Fund Advisers
Proposal (Feb. 9, 2022) (transcript available at https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/genslerstatement-private-fund-advisers-proposal-020922) (“[T]hese funds matter because of what, or who,
stands on either side of them. The funds pool the money of other people: the limited partners. And
who are those limited partners? Sometimes, they’re wealthy individuals. Often, though, they’re
retirement plans, like state government pension plans, or non-profit and university endowments.
The people behind those funds and endowments often are teachers, firefighters, municipal workers,
students, and professors.”); Allison Herren Lee, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement
on Proposed Rules for Private Fund Advisers (Feb. 9, 2022) (transcript available at
https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/lee-private-fund-20220209) (“In considering this proposal,
it’s critical to note the large and growing presence of retail investors, and particularly those with
retirement assets, exposed to this market. For example, U.S. pension funds hold roughly $480
billion in private equity investments, representing an average of about 9% of their holdings.”);
Caroline A. Crenshaw, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Private Fund Advisers Proposal –
Statement in Support of Accountability Enhancing Updates (Feb. 9, 2022) (“Private fund investors,
including entities such as pension funds, charitable organizations, and college endowments, rely on
the protections afforded by the Advisers Act and benefit from advisers’ obligations to place their
clients’ interest first.”).
19. U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Proposed Rule: Private Fund Advisers; Documentation of
Registered Investment Adviser Compliance Reviews (Feb. 9, 2022) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt
275), https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2022/ia-5955.pdf [hereinafter Feb. 2022 SEC Proposed
Rule] (“Private funds and their advisers also play an increasingly important role in the lives of
everyday Americans saving for retirement or college tuition. Some of the largest groups of private
fund investors include state and municipal pension plans, college and university endowments, nonprofit organizations, and high net worth individuals.”).
20. See infra Part V.
21. See, e.g., Letter from Steve Nelson, Chief Exec. Officer, Institutional Ltd. Partners Ass’n,
to Brent Fields, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, ILPA Follow-up Letter on Proposed
Commission Interpretation Regarding Standard of Conduct for Investment Advisers; Request for
Comment on Enhancing Investment Adviser Regulation – File No. S7-09-18, at 3 (Nov. 21, 2018),
https://ilpa.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/ILPA-Follow-Up-Letter-on-SEC-ProposedFiduciary-Duty-Interpretation-11.21.18.pdf (noting “the significant imbalance in bargaining power
between investors and private equity advisers” in recent years).
22. See, e.g., Letter from Steve Nelson, Chief Exec. Officer, Institutional Ltd. Partners Ass’n,
to Brent Fields, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Proposed Commission Interpretation Regarding
Standard of Conduct for Investment Advisers; Request for Comment on Enhancing Investment
Adviser Regulation – File No. S7-09-18, at 9 (Aug. 6, 2018), https://ilpa.org/wp-
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suggests that state and local plans in the United States had perverse incentives
to over-invest in private equity and other risky assets for many years.23
Studies show that these non-market incentives did, in fact, lead to higher
allocations by public pension plans to risky investments.24
For all these reasons, private equity is not the pure private market
contracting setting that a surface-level view of the industry might suggest.
To the contrary, even though private equity funds are considered “private
funds” under the federal securities laws, public plans have played an
enormous role in shaping how this industry works and have amplified the
public’s interest in the industry’s outcomes.
Importantly, this fact should not be seen as providing the SEC with a
blank check for intervening in the industry, and this Article does not purport
to assess the extent of the agency’s formal legal authority to enact regulations.
As noted above, the SEC implemented an industry-wide examination
program in the early-2010s that has remained quite active over the years, and
in recent months the SEC released a sweeping proposed rule that would
require managers to make a broad set of mandatory disclosures and prohibit
certain controversial practices in the industry, among other requirements.25
If SEC interventions are going to be effective, policymakers need to
understand the problems that impair effective bargaining in private equity
and tailor their interventions to respond to those problems. This Article
provides insight into one important source of potential bargaining problems
in private equity.
Furthermore, looking beyond the SEC, the many interdependencies
between private equity and public pension plans also raise questions about

content/uploads/2018/08/ILPA-Comment-Letter-on-SEC-Proposed-Fiduciary-DutyInterpretation-August-6-2018.pdf (“[A]s the market has rebounded [from the Great Recession], the
legal terms have becom[e] immensely more challenging. This has been exacerbated by the current
fundraising environment, which is characterized by unprecedented fund raising levels and speed,
where GPs have significant leverage in negotiations, and many LPs, particularly public pensions,
are forced to deploy capital under disadvantaged terms in order to achieve certain performance
thresholds designed to allow them to meet their pension and other disbursement requirements. LPs,
including even the nation’s largest public pensions, with correspondingly reduced leverage in
negotiations, have continued to face a market where they are forced to accept these reductions in
the applicability of basic duties of fairness, loyalty and good faith owed to them by the investment
advisers they invest with. This is extremely harmful to LPs and their beneficiaries . . . . As many
of these investors need to deploy their capital to meet their obligations to their beneficiaries, they
are unable to walk away from these investment terms while still meeting their funding obligations.”
(footnote omitted)).
23. See infra Sections V.B. and V.C.
24. See infra note 175 and accompanying text.
25. See infra Section VI.A.1.
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whether private equity has become too public to fail.26 The public’s
substantial investment in private equity raises legitimate questions about
moral hazard concerns in the industry.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I identifies what makes a private
equity fund “private” from a legal perspective and discusses the regulatory
implications of that status. Part II discusses how public pension plans went
from risk avoiders that rarely invested in private markets to the biggest
private equity investors in the market. Part III shows how the large-scale
participation of public pension plans in private equity complicates the
orderliness and efficiency of the private equity fund market. Part IV
discusses investor protection implications of large-scale public pension
investment in private equity. Part V identifies capital formation effects
resulting from the flow of public pension assets to private equity funds and
discusses the literature showing that public pension plans had perverse
incentives to over-invest in private equity funds for many years. Part VI
considers various policy implications. The Article then concludes.
I. PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS AS “PRIVATE FUNDS”
The term “private equity” refers to the investment strategy of acquiring
controlling positions in private companies, making financial or operational
improvements to those companies, and then selling them at a profit. A private
equity investor can obtain a controlling position either by buying a
controlling equity stake in a company that is already private, or by buying a
controlling equity stake in a public company and “taking it private” by
cashing out the minority shareholders. The “private” in the term “private
equity” thus refers to the fact that the equity held by the investor is in a
private, and not a publicly-traded, portfolio company.
Private equity is also private in another way. Private equity managers
typically raise money by pooling the capital of their various investors into a
single vehicle called a fund. In order to structure this vehicle as a
conventional private equity fund and avoid costly regulatory restrictions and
requirements, a fund must be raised in a manner that satisfies exemptions to
the SEC registration requirements under the various federal securities laws.27
26. As discussed below, the COVID-19 pandemic provided an imperfect test case for this
question, as reports suggest that the private equity industry largely came out of the pandemic
unscathed, with returns largely unaffected. See Hugh MacArthur et al., The Private Equity Market
in 2020: Escape from the Abyss, in GLOBAL PRIVATE EQUITY REPORT 2021, at 3, 4, 21 (Bain &
Co. 2021), https://www.bain.com/globalassets/noindex/2021/bain_report_2021-global-privateequity-report.pdf (“It was a year of massive disruption—and private equity emerged unscathed. . . .
By all indications, private equity weathered 2020’s perfect storm without taking a hit to returns.”).
27. Registration imposes obligations on managers that are typically viewed as costly and
incompatible with the management of a typical private equity fund. See PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS:
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Thus, a private equity fund is also a “private fund”28 in the sense that it avoids
registration with the SEC under most of the federal securities statutes, unlike
mutual funds and other “public funds” that are registered with the SEC.
To avoid registration under the Securities Act of 1933, all of a fund’s
investors typically must be “accredited investors” that meet certain net worth
thresholds ($5 million for most entities and $1 million for individuals).29
Registration under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (the “Investment
Company Act”) can be avoided if a fund’s investors are all “qualified
purchasers” that satisfy a higher set of net worth thresholds (generally $25
million for entities and $5 million for individuals).30 Furthermore, if a fund’s
general partner wants to charge investors carried interest,31 all fund investors
must also meet the “qualified client” standard set forth in Rule 205-3 of the
Advisers Act, which currently requires entities and natural persons to have a
net worth of at least $2.2 million or an investment with the manager of at
least $1.1 million.32
Given the significant requirements that investors must satisfy before
they can enter the industry, one might expect private funds to be a model
environment for private ordering. Basic law and economics theory supports
the idea that sophisticated private parties will engage in optimal bargaining
under the right conditions.33 Moreover, if the investors participating in
BUSINESS STRUCTURE AND OPERATIONS § 8.03, LexisNexis (database updated Aug. 2021) (“[T]he
substantive requirements imposed on registered investment companies are not compatible with the
business plan and management structure of a typical private equity fund.”).
28. See Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 202(a)(29) (defining “private fund” as
an issuer that would be a registered investment company under the Investment Company Act of
1940 but for certain exemptions set forth in that statute).
29. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) for the formal definition of “accredited investor.”
30. See Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(7) (allowing a fund to raise an
unlimited amount of money from an unlimited number of investors if they are all “qualified
purchasers”). Various other exemptions to the Investment Company Act exist, but Section 3(c)(7)
is the most commonly used. Another less common exemption is Section 3(c)(1), which imposes no
sophistication requirements as long as the fund has fewer than 100 investors. Id. at § 80a-3(c)(1).
31. In practice, investors are charged carried interest in virtually every private equity fund.
Carried interest is an incentive-based fee paid to the fund’s general partner entity, which is an
affiliate of the fund manager. See STEPHANIE BRESLOW & PHYLLIS SCHWARTZ, PRIVATE EQUITY
FUNDS: FORMATION AND OPERATION § 1.01 (2d ed. 2016 & Supp. 2022) (noting that profits
generated by a fund are ordinarily “divided according to a formula which provides the General
Partner with a share (typically 20%) of the profits (the ‘Carried Interest’) attributable to the Limited
Partners’ Capital Contributions”).
32. 17 C.F.R. § 275.205-3; Order Approving Adjustment for Inflation of the Dollar Amount
Tests in Rule 205-3 under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 86 Fed. Reg. 32,993 (June 23,
2021).
33. See, e.g., Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract
Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 547 (2003) (arguing for formalist interpretation of contracts between
sophisticated economic actors); Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael L. Katz, Judicial Modification of
Contracts Between Sophisticated Parties: A More Complete View of Incomplete Contracts and
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private funds can satisfy such significant net worth standards, it seems logical
to conclude that those investors will be able to sustain the risk of potential
losses, making it unnecessary to impose restrictions on leverage, incentive
compensation, investment concentration, and other factors that lead to
increased investment risk.
Historically, policymakers approached private equity with this
perspective in mind. Private equity funds could generally opt out of the
registration requirements for each of the federal securities statutes, and they
operated almost entirely off the SEC’s radar. Similarly, scholars held out
private equity funds as a leading example of private ordering by contract in
the academic literature, touting the ability of private equity investors and
managers to contract for efficient terms.34
The first significant deviation from this policy approach happened in
2010, when Congress eliminated the exemption that most private equity
managers had been relying on to avoid registration under the Advisers Act.35
These changes did not dramatically modify the substantive regulatory
requirements imposed on private equity managers, as the Advisers Act is
largely a disclosure-based statute that imposes few affirmative obligations on
managers beyond disclosing their conflicts of interest36 and making
Their Breach, 9 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 230, 233 (1993) (“[I]f the private parties are sophisticated and
are symmetrically informed at the time of contracting, then there is no benefit to the courts’
mandating the terms of private contracts.” (emphasis omitted)); Alan Schwartz, How Much
Irrationality Does the Market Permit?, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 131, 131 (2008) (finding that “when
enough consumers are sophisticated and the naive have a relatively low willingness to pay for their
preferred contract, exploitative contracts decline in frequency and may actually vanish”); MICHAEL
J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 120 (1993) (“To the extent that there is a
margin of informed, sophisticated, and aggressive consumers in any given market, who understand
the terms of the standard form contracts on offer and who either negotiate over those terms or switch
their business readily to competing suppliers offering more favourable terms, they may in effect
discipline the entire market, so that inframarginal (less well informed, sophisticated, or mobile)
consumers can effectively free-ride on the discipline brought to the market by the marginal
consumers . . . .”).
34. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
35. See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Adopts Dodd-Frank Act Amendments
to Investment Advisers Act (June 22, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-133.htm
(noting that because Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act eliminated the “private adviser
exemption . . . many previously unregistered advisers, particularly those to hedge funds and private
equity funds, w[ould] have to register with the Commission and be subject to its regulatory
oversight, rules and examination”).
36. See Ceresney, supra note 15 (indicating that managers must “disclose sufficiently specific
facts such that the client is able to understand the [manager’s] conflicts of interest and business
practices, and can give informed consent to such conflicts or practices”). As a result, if a manager
has disclosed certain risks and investors have not negotiated for contractual protections against those
risks, the investors generally will be exposed to those risks without any protection from federal
fiduciary duties. Interpretive guidance issued by the SEC in 2019 on the fiduciary duties of
investment advisers did little to change the agency’s fundamental approach to regulating managers
of private funds. See Memorandum from Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP, SEC Rulemakings and
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themselves available for regular SEC examinations.37 However, by granting
examination authority to the SEC, this update gave the SEC its first direct
view into the industry’s operations, and the results of those early
examinations were troubling to many industry observers. The SEC
articulated serious concerns about fee and expense practices, transparency
problems, and issues relating to conflicts of interest in the industry,38 and the
agency brought several enforcement actions against private equity
managers.39
In the years following that initial wave of activity, the SEC’s
examination program continued unabated.40
Notwithstanding the
considerable attention that this program brought to issues of transparency and
conflicts of interest in private equity funds over the years, the industry did
not respond in a manner that was satisfying to the SEC.41 Under Chair Gary
Gensler, the SEC recently proposed a broad set of rules that would

Interpretations Addressing Investment Adviser and Broker-Dealer Standards of Conduct and
Disclosure
Obligations
(June
20,
2019),
http://www.stblaw.com/docs/defaultsource/memos/firmmemo_06_20_19.pdf (“For investment management firms that only advise
private investment funds and other institutional clients, the SEC Releases should have a limited
effect on their businesses.”).
37. Other obligations of registered managers included filing an annual, publicly available report
that sets out certain basic information about the manager’s operations and conflicts of interest. See
OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB CONTROL NO. 3235-0049, FORM
ADV (U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 2021), https://omb.report/icr/202108-3235017/doc/original/114223400.pdf. Registered managers were also required to file a confidential
annual report on Form PF with basic information about asset holdings to support systemic risk
management. See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Approves Confidential Private
Fund Risk Reporting (Oct. 26, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-226.htm.
38. See, e.g., Bowden, supra note 15; Marc Wyatt, Acting Dir., Office of Compliance
Inspections & Examinations, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Address at the Private Equity
International Private Fund Compliance Forum: Private Equity: A Look Back and a Glimpse Ahead
(May 13, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/private-equity-look-back-and-glimpseahead.html.
39. See, e.g., In re Apollo Mgmt. V, L.P., Advisers Act Release No. 4493, 2016 WL 11467649
(Aug. 23, 2016); In re TPG Cap. Advisors, LLC, Advisers Act Release No. 4830, 2017 WL 6554183
(Dec. 21, 2017); In re Blackstone Mgmt. Partners, L.L.C., Advisers Act Release No. 4219, 2015
WL 5834037 (Oct. 7, 2015).
40. See Risk Alert: Observations from Examinations of Investment Advisers Managing Private
Funds, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N OFF. OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS AND EXAMINATIONS 1 (June
23, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/files/Private%20Fund%20Risk%20Alert_0.pdf [hereinafter Risk
Alert 2020] (noting that “OCIE examines hundreds of private fund advisers each year”); Risk Alert
Observations from Examinations of Private Fund Advisers, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N DIV. OF
EXAMINATIONS (Jan. 27, 2022), https://www.sec.gov/files/private-fund-risk-alert-pt-2.pdf.
41. See Feb. 2022 SEC Proposed Rule, supra note 19, at 9 (“The [SEC] has pursued
enforcement actions against private fund advisers for practices that have caused private funds to pay
more in fees and expenses than they should have . . . or resulted in investors not being informed of
relevant conflicts of interest . . . . Despite our examination and enforcement efforts, these activities
persist.”).
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dramatically increase its intervention in the industry, driven by unresolved
concerns about how the industry operates.42
Why does private equity matter to the SEC? Should it? In this Article,
I argue that public pension plans are an important part of the answer to these
questions.
II. HOW PUBLIC PENSIONS BECAME THE BIGGEST INVESTORS IN PRIVATE
EQUITY FUNDS
Public pension plans are the single most important source of capital for
private equity funds.43 Ranging from some of the smallest investors in the
industry to some of the largest and most influential, the total volume of
money that is collectively invested by public plans in private equity today is
staggering.
So even though private equity funds themselves have historically been
largely exempted from direct regulation under the federal securities laws, the
largest investors in these funds are government-sponsored entities subject to
their own sets of internal regulations.44 This kind of large-scale investment
in private equity funds is a relatively recent development for state and local
plans in the United States.
A. When Public Pensions Started to Embrace Risk
For much of their history, state and local pension plans were legally
prohibited from holding risky assets.45 For most plans, this meant that they
could only invest the pension fund’s assets in bonds issued by federal, state,
or local governments. When public plans were allowed to invest in the
securities of private businesses, they were typically limited to a “legal list”
containing only the safest, blue chip corporate investments.46 In 1942, state
pensions invested 90% of their portfolios in public bonds issued by federal,

42.
43.
44.
45.

See infra Section VI.A.1.
See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
See infra Section III.A.
See PEW CHARITABLE TRS. & LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND., STATE PUBLIC PENSION
INVESTMENTS SHIFT OVER PAST 30 YEARS, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS ISSUE BRIEF 2 (2014),
https://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/assets/2014/06/state_public_pension_investments_shift_over_
past_30_years.pdf [hereinafter PEW BRIEF 2014] (“Before the early 1980s, many public retirement
plans were bound by strict regulations limiting their investment options.”).
46. See ROBERT L. CLARK, LEE A. CRAIG & JOHN SABELHAUS, State and Local Pension Plans
During the Great Depression, in STATE AND LOCAL RETIREMENT PLANS IN THE UNITED STATES
36, 40 (2011) (“Admission to the legal list was based on a compilation of corporate assets, earnings,
dividends, prior default history, and so forth. The objective was to provide a list that consisted of
the bluest of blue chip corporate securities.”).
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state, and local governments, and just 10% of their funds in stocks, corporate
bonds, mortgages, and other private assets.47
Nearly all states and cities that maintained pension plans invested a large
percentage of their investment portfolios in their own securities. These were
secure investments, and by purchasing its own debt a state or locality could
avoid the transaction costs associated with both selling its own debt in the
market and buying other investments for its pension funds. In effect, a city
or state was simply borrowing money from one state account—the pension
fund—to pay for another, like a school construction fund, for example.48
While some have argued that this approach was both safe and sufficiently
high-yielding,49 it did suffer from an important flaw. Because municipal
bonds are exempt from state and federal income taxes, they offer lower yields
than similarly risky corporate bonds.50 When income tax rates jumped during
World War II, public pension managers were forced to decide between
continuing to invest in municipal bonds and shifting into higher-yielding
private securities.51 By 1972, state pensions were investing 96% of their
funds in the securities of private-sector companies.52
After moving to private-sector investments, state and local plans
initially focused primarily on investments in fixed-income corporate
securities. While these investments were riskier than bonds issued by
governmental entities, they were still relatively low-risk investments. As
recently as the early 1980s, public pension plans were still investing nearly
80% of their portfolios in fixed income securities and cash.53
In recent decades, however, public pension plans have come to fully
embrace the riskiest sectors of the market. By 2016, the average public
pension plan invested over 70% of its portfolio in corporate stocks, private
equity funds, hedge funds, and others.54 The “risk premium” of the average
47. See Michael R. Glass & Sean H. Vanatta, The Next COVID-19 Victim? Public Pension
Funds., WASH. POST (Apr. 17, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/04/17/nextcovid-19-victim-public-pension-funds/.
48. See ROBERT CLARK, LEE A. CRAIG & JACK W. WILSON, Early Pension Plans for State and
Local Workers, in A HISTORY OF PUBLIC SECTOR PENSIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 167, 212
(2003).
49. See id. Some commentators have proposed returning to this practice of “fiscal mutualism.”
See Glass & Vanatta, supra note 47 (recommending a return to the early 1900s practice that
preferred “public investment over maximum returns”).
50. Unlike individual investors, states and cities do not benefit from the tax-exempt nature of
state and local bonds because they do not pay taxes.
51. See Glass & Vanatta, supra note 47 (“By 1945, tax-exempt municipal bonds yielded less
than half of taxable corporate bonds.”).
52. Id.
53. See PEW BRIEF 2014, supra note 45, at 3.
54. State Public Pension Funds’ Investment Practices and Performance: 2016 Data Update
PEW
CHARITABLE
TRS.
2
(Sept.
2018),
https://www.pewtrusts.org/-

2022]

HOW PUBLIC PENSIONS HAVE SHAPED PRIVATE EQUITY

853

public pension plan’s investment portfolio—that portion of the plan’s
expected return attributable to higher risk exposure—dramatically rose
during this period.55 One study’s measures show that the investment risk of
public pension portfolios more than tripled between 2000 and the late
2010s.56 Notably, studies show that in the years leading up to COVID-19,
state and local pension plans took on risk more aggressively than both private
U.S. pension plans and public pension plans in other parts of the world.57
Private investment funds have become an integral part of the investment
portfolios held by most state and local public pension plans. Whereas
“alternative” assets only made up 11% of public pension assets in 2006, by
2016 this number had jumped to 26%.58 A majority of these alternative
investments are investments in private investment funds, including private
equity funds and hedge funds.59
In the process, public pension plans have collectively become the largest
investors in the private equity industry. A far cry from their conservative
early days, public pension plans now supply over 35% of the capital in the
private equity industry.60 This has created an unusual dynamic. Private
equity funds and hedge funds go to great lengths to avoid public scrutiny and
/media/assets/2018/09/statepublicpensionfundsinvestmentpracticesandperformance2016dataupdate_chartbook.pdf [hereinafter Pew Brief Sept. 2018].
55. This increase can be attributed both to increased exposure to risky investments and to a
global decline in debt security interest rates during this period.
See
id.https://www.pewtrusts.org/-

/media/assets/2018/09/statepublicpensionfundsinvestmentpracticesandperf
ormance-2016dataupdate_chartbook.pdf

56. See Greg Mennis, Susan Banta & David Draine, Assessing the Risk of Fiscal Distress for
Public Pensions: State Stress Test Analysis 52 (Harv. Kennedy Sch. Mossavar-Rahmani Ctr. for
Bus.
&
Gov’t,
Working
Paper
No.
92,
2018),
https://www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/centers/mrcbg/files/AWP_92_final.pdf (observing
that since 2000, “measures of investment risk for pension portfolios have more than tripled, as has
the use of higher-cost alternative investments, including real estate, private equity, and hedge
funds”).
57. See DONALD J. BOYD & YIMENG YIN, SUNY ROCKEFELLER INST. OF GOV’T, HOW PUBLIC
PENSION PLAN INVESTMENT RISK AFFECTS FUNDING AND CONTRIBUTION RISK 1–2 (2017),
https://www.albany.edu/slgf/Reports_and_Briefs/2017-01-10-Pension_Investment_Risks.pdf
(showing that risky assets made up just 53% of the investment portfolios of private U.S. pension
plans in 2016 as compared with approximately 70% of state and local plans); Aleksander Andonov,
Rob M.M.J. Bauer & K.J. Martijn Cremers, Pension Fund Asset Allocation and Liability Discount
Rates, 30 REV. FIN. STUD. 2555, 2592 (2017) (“Our results suggest that, over time, U.S. public
pension funds have become the biggest risk-takers among pension funds internationally.”).
58. See Pew Brief Sept. 2018, supra note 54, at 3.
59. See Jean-Pierre Aubry, Anqi Chen & Alicia H. Munnell, A First Look at Alternative
Investments and Public Pensions, CTR. FOR RET. RSCH. AT BOS. COLL. 4 (July 2017),
http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/slp_55.pdf (showing that over 66% of public pension
investments in “alternative” investments in 2015 were directed to private equity and hedge funds).
60. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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SEC registration under the federal securities laws,61 yet their most important
investors are themselves public entities that are managed on behalf of public
servants and funded by taxpayers. These private vehicles thus have an impact
that is remarkably broad and public in scope, notwithstanding the fact that
much of their activity is kept private and their investors are typically subject
to strict confidentiality restrictions.62
B. Scholarly Response – Is This Good for Public Plans?
Many scholars have been critical of this elevated risk-taking by state
and local pension plans, noting that it has made public pension systems
vulnerable to market downturns.63 While investments in riskier assets may
increase the mean expected return distribution for public plans, they also
dramatically increase the variation of expected returns.64 Notable economists
have argued that this approach to risk by public plans creates “a small

61. See supra Part I.
62. See Madison Marriage & Chris Newlands, Pension Funds Forced to Sign Non-Disclosure
Agreements, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2014), https://www.ft.com/content/94524a60-5b96-11e4-81ac00144feab7de (“Anger has erupted over the practice of asset managers coercing pension funds into
signing non-disclosure agreements.”); Gretchen Morgenson, Behind Private Equity’s Curtain, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 18, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/19/business/retirement/behind-privateequitys-curtain.html (“[I]n exchange for what they hope will be hefty returns, many pension funds
have signed onto a kind of omerta, or code of silence, about the terms of the funds’ investments.”).
63. See, e.g., Mennis et al., supra note 56, at 1 (“These factors indicate that public pension
systems may be more vulnerable to an economic downturn than they have ever been.”); Pew Brief
Sept. 2018, supra note 54, at 12 (“Public retirement systems continued to move assets from lowerrisk fixed-income investments to higher-risk alternative and equity investments in 2016, resulting
in greater vulnerability to market volatility and higher fees.”); DONALD J. BOYD & YIMENG YIN,
SUNY ROCKEFELLER INST. OF GOV’T, APPROPRIATENESS OF RISK-TAKING BY PUBLIC PENSION
PLANS
21
(2017),
https://www.albany.edu/slgf/Reports_and_Briefs/2017-02-01Risk_Taking_Appropriateness.pdf (“The potential consequence of investment shortfalls, relative to
state and local government tax revenue, is now more than three times as large as it was in 1995, and
about ten times as large as in 1985.”).
64. See James Farrell & Daniel Shoag, Risky Choices: Simulating Public Pension Funding
Stress with Realistic ShocksError! Hyperlink reference not valid. 43 (Harv. Kennedy Sch.,
Working Paper No. RWP16-053, 2016), https://www.hks.harvard.edu/publications/risky-choicessimulating-public-pension-funding-stress-realistic-shocks (“[T]he movement towards riskier asset
classes that has occurred has had a predictable effect on the distribution of outcomes. While higher
risk, higher return allocation improves funding outcomes and reduces total costs at the median, it
also greatly increases costs at the tail of the distribution.”); Donald J. Boyd & Yimeng Yin,
Investment Risk-Taking by Public Pension Plans: Potential Consequences for Pension Funds, State
and Local Governments, and Stakeholders in Government, BROOKINGS INST. SIXTH ANN. MUN.
FIN. CONF. 5 (July 17, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/boyd.pdf
(showing model results finding a high risk of severe underfunding in cases where public plans invest
in high-risk portfolios).
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probability of an extremely good outcome and a large probability of poor
outcomes.”65
Scholars have noted that concerns about this exposure to risk are
amplified because low returns to risky investments are highly correlated with
the state of the economy. This means that public pension plans are likely to
need higher contributions due to low investment returns at precisely the times
when tax revenues are reduced due to macroeconomic weakness.66 Beyond
the academic literature, various commentators,67 judges,68 and popular media
sources69 have characterized public pension risk-taking in recent years as
gambling with the public’s money.
There are mixed reviews on whether the increase in public pension
exposure to private equity funds,70 specifically, has been a positive
development. On one hand, some proponents claim that private equity funds
outperform other asset classes71 and bring significant diversification benefits
that cannot be achieved with investments in public securities alone. For
example, the American Investment Council, the private equity industry’s
trade association headquartered in Washington D.C., claims that private
equity has been the highest-performing asset class for public pension plans
for most of the past decade.72 Because private equity funds require that

65. Robert Novy-Marx & Joshua D. Rauh, The Liabilities and Risks of State-Sponsored
Pension Plans, J. ECON. PERSPS., Fall 2009, at 191, 192 (“Under current pension fund investment
policy, there is a wide distribution of possible future funding outcomes. The outcomes are skewed
in such a way that there is a small probability of an extremely good outcome and a large probability
of poor outcomes.”).
66. See, e.g., Daniel Biggs, The Public Pensions Quadrilemma: The Intersection of Investment
Risk and Contribution Risk, PROC. ANNUAL CONF. ON TAXATION & MINUTES ANNUAL MEETING
NAT’L TAX ASS’N, 2014, at 27 (“Stock prices are correlated with the state of the economy, meaning
that low returns and higher required contributions may occur at times when tax revenues are
weak. . . . Additional dollars are needed when the marginal value of a dollar is highest, while
surpluses occur when a marginal dollar is less valuable.”).
67. Daniel Tenreiro, As Shortfalls Grow, Public-Pension Funds Roll the Dice, NAT’L REV.
(June 17, 2020, 6:30 AM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2020/06/calpers-public-pension-fundsadd-risk-to-meet-return-targets/.
68. See infra note 152 and accompanying text.
69. See, e.g., Marcela Gaviria, Martin Smith & Nick Verbitsky, The Pension Gamble, PBS
FRONTLINE (Oct. 23, 2018), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/film/the-pension-gamble/.
70. See supra notes 58–59 and accompanying text.
71. See, e.g., Robert S. Harris, Tim Jenkinson & Steven N. Kaplan, Private Equity
Performance: What Do We Know?, 69 J. FIN. 1851, 1852–53 (2014).
72. See
Public
Pension
Study,
A M.
INV.
COUNCIL
5
(July
2019),
https://www.investmentcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2019-public-pension-study.pdf (claiming
that private equity has been the highest-performing asset class in public pension portfolios for the
past seven years).
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investors lock up their capital for long periods of time, investors theoretically
should be able to demand an “illiquidity premium” in those investments.73
Some academic research, however, casts doubt on these claims. Many
studies show that the rate of returns from investing in public and private
markets have been converging over time, with any excess returns from
private equity investments largely absent today.74 Diversification benefits
from investing in private funds have also been called into question by recent
research, which shows that the data on returns of private investments
artificially understates volatility due to the infrequent nature of observation
of returns and the use of appraised valuations to construct returns on illiquid
assets.75 Some scholars argue that, because of this, there are no well-accepted
and reliable measures of the diversification benefits of private investment
funds.76
As will be discussed in greater detail,77 scholars have also criticized
private equity funds for weak disclosure and governance practices,78 and the
73. See What Is the Illiquidity Premium?, ECONOMIST (Nov. 9, 2019),
https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2019/11/07/what-is-the-illiquidity-premium.
But see Erik Stafford, Replicating Private Equity with Value Investing, Homemade Leverage, and
Hold-to-Maturity Accounting 27 (Harv. Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 16-081, 2015),
https://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/ReplicatingPE_201512_3859877f-bd53-4d3e99aa-6daec2a3a2d3.pdf (arguing that private equity investments do not earn an illiquidity premium
because returns can be replicated (and exceeded) by investing in small value stocks with leverage).
74. See, e.g., Robert S. Harris et al., How Do Private Equity Investments Perform Compared to
Public Equity?, 14 J. INV. MGMT. 14, 15 (2016); Ludovic Phalippou, Performance of Buyout Funds
Revisited?, 18 REV. FIN. 189, 189 (2014); Ludovic Phalippou & Oliver Gottschalg, The
Performance of Private Equity Funds, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 1747, 1747 (2009); Berk A. Sensoy,
Yingdi Wang & Michael S. Weisbach, Limited Partner Performance and the Maturing of the
Private Equity Industry, 112 J. FIN. ECON. 320, 341–42 (2014); Ludovic Phalippou, An Inconvenient
Fact: Private Equity Returns and the Billionaire Factory 3 (Univ. of Oxford, Said Bus. Sch.,
Working Paper, 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3623820 [hereinafter
Phalippou, An Inconvenient Fact].
75. See generally Gregory W. Brown, Oleg R. Gredil & Steven N. Kaplan, Do Private Equity
Funds Manipulate Reported Returns?, 132 J. FIN. ECON. 267 (2019); Arthur Korteweg, Risk
Adjustment in Private Equity Returns, 11 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 131 (2019).
76. See, e.g., Phalippou, An Inconvenient Fact, supra note 74, at 30–31 (“I do not know how to
measure risk and diversification in [private equity], nor know any academic studies offering a wellaccepted approach . . . . [R]eliable measures of these benefits are at best hard to come by.”).
77. See infra Section III.B.
78. See, e.g., David T. Robinson & Berk A. Sensoy, Do Private Equity Fund Managers Earn
Their Fees? Compensation, Ownership and Cash Flow Performance, 26 REV. FIN. STUD. 2760,
2761 (2013) (“[T]he typical private equity contract allows GPs to earn excessive compensation and
does too little to discipline GPs or to provide them with incentives to maximize LP returns.”);
Bowden, supra note 15 (“[M]ost limited partnership agreements do not provide limited partners
with sufficient information rights to be able to adequately monitor not only their investments, but
also the operations of their manager. Of course, many managers voluntarily provide important
information and disclosures to their investors, but we find that broad, imprecise language in limited
partnership agreements often leads to opaqueness when transparency is most needed.”).
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high fee structure of private funds has been the subject of significant
disapproval over the years.79 Recent research also shows significant
heterogeneity in returns experienced by public pension plans independent of
plan size, reinforcing perceptions of the asset class’s complexity.80
III. EFFECT #1: COMPLICATING THE ORDERLINESS AND EFFICIENCY OF
PRIVATE EQUITY
It is difficult to overstate just how much this flow of public pension
capital to private markets has affected the private equity industry. In the
remainder of this Article, I examine the influence of public plans on private
equity using the SEC’s three-part mission as an analytical framework.81 I
start by discussing the effect of public pension plans on the orderliness and
efficiency of the private equity fund market.
A. Less Free Contracting, More Regulatory Influence on Terms
If the private equity fund industry were an ideal private market setting
where all parties were rational, self-interested parties who bargain for optimal
outcomes on their own, then the best policy response would be to take a
completely hands-off approach in regulating the industry. Doing so would
lead to the most efficient outcomes and maximize returns for all parties in the
market. Large-scale investment by public pension plans, however,
introduces many non-market incentives and non-market actors that
complicate this simple view.

79. See, e.g., EILEEN APPELBAUM & ROSEMARY BATT, CTR. FOR ECON. & POL’Y RSCH., FEES,
FEES AND MORE FEES: HOW PRIVATE EQUITY ABUSES ITS LIMITED PARTNERS AND U.S.
TAXPAYERS 12 (2016), https://cepr.net/images/stories/reports/private-equity-fees-2016-05.pdf;
Lizzy Gurdus, Hedge Funds’ ‘Obscene’ Fees Make People Rich – Just Not Investors, Says Buffett,
CNBC: BUFFETT WATCH (Feb. 27, 2017, 10:01 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/02/27/buffetthedge-funds-fees-border-on-obscene.html (“[Hedge fund fees] make a lot of people rich, and it’s
going to make very few investors rich.” “[It] borders on obscene.”); DAVID F. SWENSEN,
UNCONVENTIONAL SUCCESS: A FUNDAMENTAL APPROACH TO PERSONAL INVESTMENT 135
(2005) (“Some part of the failure of buyout managers to produce risk-adjusted returns stems from
the inappropriate fee structure. . . . The large majority of buyout funds fail to add sufficient value
to overcome a grossly unreasonable fee structure.”).
80. See Juliane Begenau & Emil Siriwardane, How Do Private Equity Fees Vary Across Public
Pensions?
4
(Harv.
Bus.
Sch.
Working
Paper
No.
20-073,
2020),
https://www.hbs.edu/ris/Publication%20Files/20-073rev11-17-21_c1ee53b8-fecf-41bc-ad1dd58b8c1c4fe6.pdf.
81. See The Role of the SEC, SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.investor.gov/introductioninvesting/investing-basics/rolesec#:~:text=The%20U.%20S.%20Securities%20and%20Exchange,Facilitate%20capital%20forma
tion (last visited Oct. 29, 2021).
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In the conventional law and economics model, it is assumed that
contracting parties will agree on optimal non-price contract terms.82 Parties
are generally assumed to be sophisticated actors who use their discretion to
craft custom terms that will best accommodate the contracting relationship.
Public pension plans deviate from this assumption in two ways.
First, more than most institutional investors, public plans are typically
subject to various standing prescriptive policies and regulatory requirements
mandating that they receive certain terms. Common provisions include
information requirements relating to state FOIA obligations,83 policies
relating to political contributions and placement agents,84 restrictions on the
jurisdictions in which claims can be brought,85 limitations on the investments

82. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, The Boilerplate Puzzle, 104 MICH. L. REV. 933, 934, 938
(2006); Alan Schwartz, A Reexamination of Nonsubstantive Unconscionability, 63 VA. L. REV.
1053, 1073–74 (1977) (“Given . . . three assumptions, a firm will produce the same level of product
quality regardless of whether the firm is a monopolist or a perfect competitor.”); Alan Schwartz &
Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 554 (2003)
(“Bargaining power instead is exercised in the division of the surplus, which is determined by the
price term. Parties jointly choose the contract terms so as to maximize the surplus, which the price
[sic] may then divide unequally.”); Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Product Quality and Imperfect
Information, 52 REV. ECON. STUD. 251, 251–52, 258 (1985) (arguing that where consumers are
imperfectly informed about product prices and quality levels offered by the various sellers, and
where there are low fixed costs to providing quality, a profit-maximizing seller will offer at least
the optimal quality, but at a supracompetitive price).
83. See BRESLOW & SCHWARTZ, supra note 31, § 4.19.3[F] (“Certain state pension plans and
other governmental investors are subject to the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”). As a result,
they may be required to publicly disclose the information they receive from portfolio funds in
response to inquiries.”).
84. See Mark C. Dempsey & Kristin M. Rylko, Developing Side Letter Issues, MAYER BROWN
(2019),
https://www.mayerbrown.com/-/media/files/perspectivesevents/publications/2015/03/developing-side-letterissues/files/developing_side_letter_issues/fileattachment/developing_side_letter_issues.pdf (“[A]
growing number of governmental authorities have taken measures to restrict the use of placement
agents and curb so-called ‘pay-to-play’ abuses. . . . A common manifestation of such regulations
requires a Fund to represent and warrant to a Government Investor that it did not use a Placement
Agent to obtain such Government Investor’s investment and that no benefit was paid or promised
to the Government Investor’s employees, affiliates, or advisors to obtain its investment.” (footnote
omitted)).
85. See Thomas Smith, Margaret O’Neill & John Rife III, Side Letters: Pitfalls and Perils for
a Financing, in FUND FINANCE LAWS AND REGULATIONS 2022 (2022),
https://www.globallegalinsights.com/practice-areas/fund-finance-laws-and-regulations/12-sideletters-pitfalls-and-perils-for-a-financing (“Investors may seek to limit the jurisdictions in which a
fund can pursue claims against them. . . . Investors that are most sensitive to the jurisdiction of
proceedings tend to be sovereign investors, including U.S. state pension plans.”).
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that the fund can make,86 sovereign immunity requirements,87 and
responsible contractor policies,88 among various others. These kinds of
requirements reinforce a commonly-criticized aspect of private equity fund
contracting: the fact that in most fund launches, it is very common for
investors and managers to spend a large amount of time negotiating “side
letters” to the primary fund documents.89 When each institutional investor
has a different set of required terms that they are required to obtain, it
becomes difficult to reflect those terms in the same document as a practical
matter. This has contributed to a process that has been criticized as
unnecessarily burdensome and costly.90
Second, unlike most institutional investors, public pension plans have
law-making bodies standing behind them that can respond to specific market
developments by passing statutory requirements, thereby taking certain terms
off the negotiating table. Most famously, the State of California (and, to a
lesser extent, certain other states) did this in 2016 when it passed detailed
86. See, e.g., Eugene Kontorovich, Illinois Passes Historic Anti-BDS Bill, as Congress Mulls
Similar Moves, WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 18, 2015, 9:33 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/05/18/illinois-passes-historicanti-bds-bill-as-congress-mulls-similar-moves/ (noting that a wave of legislation preventing public
plans from investing in companies that boycott Israel had swept states throughout the nation); James
Comtois, Massachusetts Introduces Legislation Requiring MassPRIM to Divest from Gun
Manufacturers,
PENSIONS
&
INVS.
(Mar.
16,
2018,
1:00
AM),
https://www.pionline.com/article/20180316/ONLINE/180319891/massachusetts-introduceslegislation-requiring-massprim-to-divest-from-gun-manufacturers; Heather Gillers, CalPERS’
Dilemma: Save the World or Make Money?, WALL ST. J. (June 16, 2019, 4:22 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/calpers-dilemma-save-the-world-or-make-money-11560684601
(noting that in the aftermath of the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, more than twenty states passed
laws that could compel their pension funds to divest from Sudan, Iran, or other governments
considered by the United States to be sponsors of terrorist activity).
87. See BRESLOW & SCHWARTZ, supra note 31, § 4.19.3[H] (“Government investors, such as
state pension plans and sovereign wealth plans, often seek to include side letter provisions
acknowledging their sovereign immunity.”).
88. See David H. Webber, Reforming Pensions While Retaining Shareholder Voice, 99 B.U. L.
REV. 1001, 1010 (2019).
89. In fact, in a 2020 survey of seventy institutional investors, institutional investors reported
that more time was spent negotiating side letter terms than limited partnership agreement (“LPA”)
terms. See William W. Clayton, High-End Bargaining Problems, 75 VAND. L. REV. 703, 753–54
(2022).
90. One prominent private funds attorney recently estimated that a law firm representing a
manager in a substantial fundraise will typically spend about 7,000 hours negotiating contract terms
with investors. Vicky Meek, LPA Blues, in PRIVATE EQUITY FINDINGS 24, 26 (Coller Cap., 2020),
https://www.collercapital.com/sites/default/files/Private%20Equity%20Findings%20Issue%2016_
0.pdf (“[A]cting for a general partner with a [10 billion euro]-plus fund, for example, [Jason Glover,
managing partner of Simpson Thacher & Bartlett’s London office] estimates that on average, his
team spends 7,000 hours negotiating terms with limited partners and their legal counsel. ‘That’s a
vast amount of time, but it’s pretty typical.’”). See also PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS, supra note 27,
§ 11.14 (“Side letters can be costly to negotiate and administratively burdensome, especially when
a Fund grants voluminous side letters with overlapping provisions to multiple investors.”).
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legislation in response to revelations that private equity fund managers had
been charging hidden fees that were not specifically disclosed to investors.91
Various other states either followed California’s lead or seriously considered
doing so.92 Ever since that law went into effect, California pension plans
have been required to receive the same detailed set of fee disclosures. The
New York City pension system made a similar move in 2016 when city
officials passed a policy prohibiting the system from agreeing to any terms
that required the system to indemnify its private equity fund managers.93 As
I have argued in a prior article,94 this approach to regulating public pension
investments in private equity faces distinct challenges.95 These examples
illustrate one of the more extreme ways in which non-market actors can play
an outsize role in setting contract terms in the private equity space when
public pension plans are present in the market.
Even setting aside formal policies and regulations that dictate public
pension bargaining behavior, the staff members and trustees at public pension
plans are also subject to informal pressures that can influence their bargaining
activity. Because public pension plans are taxpayer-backed government
entities, they are typically subject to greater public scrutiny than other types
of institutional investors and private individuals. Thus, concerns about
“headline risk” can be expected to play an especially significant role in
decision-making by public pension plans.96
One recent survey illustrates how public pension plans approach
bargaining differently than other types of investors. In a 2020 survey of
senior in-house legal counsel at seventy institutional investors, respondents
were asked to identify their top three negotiating priorities when they invest
in a private equity fund.97 Among the various options available to
respondents, the survey included an option for imposing stronger fiduciary
91. For a detailed discussion of this fee transparency movement, see William W. Clayton,
Public Investors, Private Funds, and State Law, 72 BAYLOR L. REV. 294, 320–21, 327 (2020).
92. See id. at 328–29.
93. See Josh Kosman, Scott Stringer Eyes Looser Pension Rules for Private-Equity Firms, N.Y.
POST (Feb. 23, 2021, 5:12 PM), https://nypost.com/2021/02/23/scott-stringer-eyes-looser-pensionrules-for-private-equity/.
94. See Clayton, supra note 91, at 334–43.
95. See Kosman, supra note 93 (“[New York City Comptroller Scott] Stringer argues that the
rule has lately deprived the city’s pensions for employees, teachers, police and firefighters of
promising deals with top-performing buyout firms. Last year, three such deals worth a total of $843
million fizzled because of the rule.”).
96. See Isobel Markham, Hitting the Headlines: Reputational Risk in VC, PRIV. EQUITY INT’L
(May 29, 2018), https://www.privateequityinternational.com/hitting-headlines-reputational-riskvc/ (“There are a number of trustees, mostly at state pension plans but some universities, that seem
to be as focused on reputational issues and social issues as they are on returns. Managers of pension
plans can feel they’re required by trustees to not invest in certain types of companies . . . .”).
97. See Clayton, supra note 89, at 50.
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duties/standard of care on the managers of the private equity funds that they
invest in. Interestingly, only 22% of the non-public pension plan respondents
included this as one of their top three negotiating priorities.98 This result,
considered in isolation, seems to be consistent with the contractarian view
that sophisticated contracting parties can identify more efficient contractual
alternatives to fiduciary duties.99 But that view is seriously called into
question by the public pension plan responses. Unlike the other investor
types, 59% of public pension plans identified fiduciary duties/standard of
care as one of their top three negotiating priorities,100 as shown in the chart
below.
Figure A

While we do not know for certain what accounts for this difference, one
plausible explanation is that public plans’ heightened concerns about
headline risk and internal policies are influencing their decision-making.
Whatever the reason, the contrast in attitudes between public pension plans
and other investor types with respect to this important term is striking,
particularly given the extraordinary size of the collective investment in
private equity funds by public plans.
B. States and Localities Are Insulated from Market Forces
In addition to the non-market-based issues discussed above, the state
and local officials making decisions about how to fund and manage public
pension plans are often more insulated from market forces than other types
of institutional investors. State and local officials ultimately must answer to
two audiences. First, when a state or locality wants to issue debt to fund a

98. See id.
99. See, e.g., Ribstein, supra note 1, at 290, 299 (“[Contractual mechanisms] substitute for
costlier and often ineffective corporate-type monitoring devices, including the use of independent
directors, owner voting, and fiduciary duties. . . . Substituting these incentive devices for
monitoring is a particularly efficient tradeoff in private-equity firms given the high costs of
constraining the discretion of expert managers.”).
100. See Clayton, supra note 89, at 50 for a more detailed discussion of the survey and the survey
results.
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new initiative or infrastructure project, they have to persuade investors in the
municipal bond market that the state or locality is sufficiently well-positioned
to pay off its existing obligations such that it can afford to take on new debt.
Second, state and local officials that want to be reelected will eventually have
to seek the support of the voters, and if voters believe that officials have done
a poor job running the plan, they can vote them out of their positions.
There are reasons to question, however, whether either of these
audiences is likely to do a very good job imposing discipline on public
pension plan officials. Approximately $4 trillion of municipal debt issued by
state and local governments was outstanding as of 2019.101 What makes this
market particularly distinctive is the conservative risk profile of the typical
investor. Bonds issued by state and local issuers are commonly marketed as
“widow and orphan” securities because they are perceived as safe for
vulnerable and risk-averse investors.102 Defaults in this market tend to be
uncommon because state and local governments typically pledge their full
“faith and credit” or taxing power for general obligation bonds.103 For
revenue bonds, issuers commonly pledge dedicated revenue streams as
security.104 In other words, the taxpayers of the state or municipality are
effectively guaranteeing the bond, whether they know it or not.
For these reasons, when someone invests in a municipal bond, they are
typically justified in feeling confident that the risk of default is relatively low.
While this does not eliminate investor scrutiny of the creditworthiness of the
issuing government body,105 it almost certainly takes some of the pressure
off.
Democratic accountability is thus an important form of discipline in this
area. State and local officials must answer to voters at every election. But
voters face challenges that must be overcome before the ballot box can serve
as an effective source of discipline on state and local pension officials.
Pension management is a complex concept for the average voter to
101. See Fixed Income Outstanding, SECS. INDUS. & FIN. MKTS. ASS’N,
https://www.sifma.org/resources/research/fixed-income-chart/ (choose “All Years”; then click
“19”) (last visited Dec. 15, 2021).
102. Christine Sgarlata Chung, Municipal Securities: The Crisis of State and Local Government
Indebtedness, Systemic Costs of Low Default Rates, and Opportunities for Reform, 34 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1455, 1460–61 (2013) (“Municipal securities are marketed to investors as ‘widow and orphan’
securities—i.e., safe for vulnerable and risk averse investors—because state and local government
issuers rarely default or obtain discharge.” (footnote omitted)).
103. See id. at 1461.
104. See id.
105. See Jacquelyn Gillette, Delphine Samuels & Frank S. Zhou, The Effect of Credit Ratings
on Disclosure: Evidence from the Recalibration of Moody’s Municipal Ratings, 58 J. ACCT. RSCH.
693 (2020) (finding that municipal bond investors demand more disclosure from municipalities with
lower credit ratings).

2022]

HOW PUBLIC PENSIONS HAVE SHAPED PRIVATE EQUITY

863

understand. As a result, for voting to serve as an effective check on pension
mismanagement, there is a basic knowledge and sophistication barrier that
must be overcome. In addition, even if voters can clearly identify pension
mismanagement, that will typically be one of many relevant issues in a
political race, and it may get overwhelmed by other considerations.
For all these reasons, the politicians and staff in charge of managing
public pension plans are often less accountable to market forces than
similarly situated individuals in other types of large institutions that invest in
private equity funds.
C. Public Pension Plans and ESG
The rise of the ESG movement has been one of the biggest trends in
global finance in recent years.106 While private equity firms have adopted
many ESG principles into their operations,107 private equity in general has
been slower to embrace ESG than publicly-traded companies and registered
investment funds.108 Some cynics argue that the ESG movement has actually
been a strategic advantage for private equity-backed portfolio companies
because they can largely avoid the glare of public scrutiny.109
Institutional investors in Europe have been more focused on ESG in
private equity than U.S. investors as a general matter, and European private
equity fund managers have responded with more developed ESG

106. See Georg Kell, The Remarkable Rise of ESG, FORBES (July 11, 2018, 10:09 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/georgkell/2018/07/11/the-remarkable-rise-ofesg/?sh=3ab5b3041695.
107. ESG and the Private Markets: Navigating the Application of ESG in the Private Markets,
PITCHBOOK
8,
10–11
(Apr.
28,
2021),
https://files.pitchbook.com/website/files/pdf/PitchBook_Analyst_Note_ESG_and_the_Private_Ma
rkets.pdf (“[P]rivate capital fund managers are feeling pressure from LPs and other stakeholders to
think within a sustainable investment framework. Our 2020 survey indicated that GPs are
increasingly receiving questions from potential investors. Many are working to incorporate
sustainable investment thinking into their business models.”).
108. See Julie Segal, The Pressure Is on Private Equity to Take ESG Seriously, INSTITUTIONAL
INV. (Feb. 1, 2021), https://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article/b1qcg33v33y7zl/The-PressureIs-on-Private-Equity-To-Take-ESG-Seriously (“Pensions and other institutions that want to hire
private equity firms that consider the environmental impact or the diversity of a company’s
employees in its investment decisions may have to wait a while. Only 24 percent of private equity
firms took environmental, social, and governance matters seriously and at the same time had a
mature process in place to evaluate these factors before acquiring a company, according to a survey
by Ernst & Young.”).
109. See Patrick Jenkins, The Private Equity Backlash Against ESG, FIN. TIMES (July 19, 2021),
https://www.ft.com/content/7e8edfd5-fccd-4f3c-9fda-c616b805c856
(“More
freedom
on
governance has long been seen as a plus for private companies. As listed company governance has
become stricter, so the advantage of private company status has increased.”).
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programs.110 However, some of the largest public plans in the United States
have also expressed a strong commitment to ESG principles in private equity
funds.111 This may not come as a surprise, given the prominent role that large
U.S. public pension plans have played in promoting ESG in their public
company investment activities.112 U.S. public plans have also gained a
reputation for strong engagement in publicly-traded corporations on these
issues, including by voting their shares directly and filing shareholder
proposals, among other things.113
As one scholar has argued, public pension plans should be well-suited
to prioritize ESG considerations given that the primary “residual claimants”
of public pension plans—those that will be most directly affected if the plans
perform poorly—are public taxpayers.114 Accordingly, rather than solely
maximize the wealth of beneficiaries, this approach argues that it makes
sense for public pension plans to seek to promote the welfare of the public

110. See Axel Seemann et al., The Expanding Case for ESG in Private Equity, in GLOBAL
PRIVATE EQUITY REPORT, supra note 26, at 27, 28 (“There’s also a wide gap in adoption between
the PE industry in North America and that in Europe. While 80% of the top 20 EU-based
institutional investors have committed to either the PRI, the UN’s Net-Zero Asset Owner Alliance
or the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures, less than half of the top 20 North
American institutions have done so . . . .”).
111. See id. at 33 (“European LPs have demonstrated more commitment to ESG than their
counterparts in North America, but the biggest institutions in the US and Canada, including the CPP
Investment Board, CDPQ, CalPERS and the California State Teachers’ Retirement System, are
firmly on board.”).
112. See Dana Brakman Reiser & Anne Tucker, Buyer Beware: Variation and Opacity in ESG
and ESG Index Funds, 41 CARDOZO L. REV. 1921, 1982–84 (2020) (“Although European players
are in the lead [on incorporating ESG into public corporation investments], U.S. public pension
assets are not far behind. . . . Public fund pioneers seeded the sustainable investing and ESG
markets and continue to play major roles in this growing sector.” (footnote omitted)).
113. See id. at 1983–84 (“American public pension funds also practice engagement. They vote
their shares directly, even when they invest through intermediary asset managers that vote on behalf
of their other investor clients. They seek informal influence with company leaders. They even take
the more unusual step of filing shareholder proposals.” (footnote omitted)).
114. See Paul Rose, Public Wealth Maximization: A New Framework for Fiduciary Duties in
Public Funds, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 891, 894 (2018) (arguing that in a public fund, “the government
and taxpayers . . . bear almost all of the risk should a public fund fail. In practice, individual
participant claimants function more like senior creditors with fixed claims that have little real risk
that they will not be received.”); see also David H. Webber, The Use and Abuse of Labor’s Capital,
89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2106 (2014) (advocating for a “member-first,” and not a “fund-first” approach
to public pension fund investments).
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more generally.115 This contrasts with how we would expect private investors
to act in markets that are truly private.116
In coming years, if American investors are going to behave more like
institutional investors in Europe with respect to ESG issues in private equity
funds, that movement will likely be led by public pension plans.117 Whether
such a movement would be likely to produce net benefits for the private
equity industry and for society more broadly is a subject of extensive
debate.118 Either way, these incentives certainly mark a departure from the
conventional rational, self-interested actor.
IV. EFFECT #2: INVESTOR PROTECTION CONSIDERATIONS IN PRIVATE
MARKETS
Large-scale public pension investment in private equity has also
increased the number of ordinary people who are affected by the operations
of private equity funds. Based on the SEC’s rhetoric, it appears that concern
for pension stakeholders has been a significant motivating factor behind the
agency’s interventions over the years.
A. Pension Stakeholders
1. Public Servants, Vulnerable Residents, and Taxpayers
Public pension plans invest the retirement savings of public servants,
including teachers, firefighters, policemen, and others. As a result, the
adverse effect of fraud or any other undesirable activity in a private equity
fund with public pension plan investors will ultimately extend to ordinary
people, not just high-net-worth individuals.

115. See Rose, supra note 114, at 913 (“A public wealth orientation allows pension fund trustees
to consider all of the impacts of various investments—including positive and negative externalities
that would be borne by the taxpayers—in determining how to invest. This will likely result in an
increased focus on what has been labeled as a socially responsible investment, and it will also likely
affect the time horizon of investments.”).
116. See id. at 895 (“Private investors might ignore certain effects, such as uncompensated harms
from pollution, depleted natural resources, or widespread health problems, because the government
absorbs the costs of such externalities.”)
117. See, e.g., Anna Gordon, CalPERS’ Project to Measure ESG in Private Equity Has 100
Organizations, $8 Trillion Participating, CHIEF INV. OFFICER (Jan. 19, 2022), https://www.aicio.com/news/calpers-project-to-measure-esg-in-private-equity-has-100-organizations-8-trillionparticipating/.
118. See, e.g., Aleksandar Andonov, Roman Kräussl & Joshua Rauh, Institutional Investors and
Infrastructure Investing, 34 REV. FIN. STUD. 3880, 3930 (2021) (finding that public pension plans
perform worse than private institutional investors, and that ESG preferences and regulations explain
30% of their underperformance).
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Sometimes, plan beneficiaries themselves can be exposed. However,
because pension benefits are commonly afforded significant constitutional
and statutory protections, the “ultimate guarantors” of public pension plans
are often the taxpayers in the relevant jurisdiction.119 This means that some
of the most important stakeholders of public pension plans are taxpayers and
residents in the state who rely on state services. Vulnerable residents are
affected by problematic pension investments because when a plan’s
investment performance is weak, the state or local government will have to
allocate more money than originally projected to pay its pension obligations.
One way to accomplish this is by reallocating funds away from other
government services (like education or welfare services) to make room for
those payments. The other option is for the state or local government to raise
taxes, spreading the burden across all taxpayers across the state or locality.
Either way, many of those who bear the cost are likely to be underprivileged
residents, and not well-heeled investors who can afford to sustain a
substantial risk of loss.
Another plausible reason for policymakers to be more concerned about
public pension stakeholders than the stakeholders of other types of
institutional investors is because there is a body of academic research
showing problematic investment practices by public pension plans. Studies
have shown public pension staff making investment decisions to minimize
personal career risk120 and directing investments to politically connected
companies,121 among various other questionable investment practices.122 Far
more extreme forms of self-interested behavior—including bribery, pay-to119. See ISAACS, supra note 12.
120. See, e.g., Paul Gompers & Josh Lerner, The Use of Covenants: An Empirical Analysis of
Venture Partnership Agreements, 39 J.L. & ECON. 463, 472 (1996) (finding that institutional
investor employees show a willingness to allow value to be transferred to fund managers in complex
ways that are difficult for outsiders and superiors to detect, but not in ways that can be more easily
observed and scrutinized); Josef Lakonishok, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, The Structure
and Performance of the Money Management Industry, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY:
MICROECONOMICS, 1992, at 339, 339–79 (finding significant underperformance by pension plans
attributable to agency problems, including actions taken by pension employees to shift
responsibility for poor performance).
121. See, e.g., Daniel Bradley, Christos Pantzalis & Ziaojing Yuan, The Influence of Political
Bias in State Pension Funds, 119 J. FIN. ECON. 69, 80–81 (2016) (finding that local political
connection bias is stronger for state pension funds with a higher percent of politically affiliated
trustees and that states with more influential politicians in Congress tend to invest more heavily in
politically connected local firms).
122. See, e.g., Aleksandar Andonov & Joshua D. Rauh, The Return Expectations of Public
Pension
Funds
5,
32
(Nov.
23,
2021)
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://academic.oup.com/rfs/advance-article/doi/10.1093/rfs/hhab126/6433685 (finding that
public pension plans engage in “excessive extrapolation,” which is the error of placing excessive
weight on the plan’s past returns, and that they act on those assumptions by increasing their “longterm allocations to risky assets”).
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play schemes, and other kinds of corruption by pension trustees and staff123—
have also been documented in the pension context.124 In addition, unlike
private sector institutions, public pension plans are also frequently subject to
statutory limits on the salary levels that they can pay their plan managers,125
and many important positions are filled by political appointees who may not
have investment expertise.126 Scholars posit that this can make it difficult for
123. See, e.g., Brendan Pierson, N.Y. Pension Fund Manager Charged with Taking Bribes
Pleads Guilty, REUTERS (Nov. 8, 2017, 6:43 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-new-yorkcorruption-pensions/n-y-pension-fund-manager-charged-with-taking-bribes-pleads-guiltyidUSKBN1D83AP; Matthew Dolan, Jury in Detroit Pension Case Convicts Former Treasurer, 2
Others, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 8, 2014, 6:45 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/jury-in-detroit-pensioncase-convicts-former-treasurer-2-others-1418082345; Associated Press, Former CEO of CalPERS
Is Sentenced to Prison for His ‘Spectacular Breach of Trust,’ L.A. TIMES (May 31, 2016, 3:51 PM),
https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-calpers-buenrostro-20160531-snap-story.html;
Marc
Lifsher, New York State Pension Fund Trustee Pleads Guilty to Taking Bribes, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 7.
2010), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2010-oct-07-la-fi-hevesi-20101007-story.html;
Associated Press, Guilty Plea in Fraud Case Tied to New York Pension, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2009),
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/04/nyregion/04pension.html#:~:text=Guilty%20Plea%20in%2
0Fraud%20Case%20Tied%20to%20New,million%20worth%20of%20illegal%20gifts%20to%20s
tate%20officials; CHRIS TOBE, KENTUCKY FRIED PENSIONS: A CULTURE OF COVER-UP AND
CORRUPTION (2013).
124. See Paul Rose, Public Fund Governance and Private Fund Fees (Ohio State Univ. Moritz
Coll.
L.,
Working
Paper
No.
358,
2016),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2805452 (“Corruption in public pension funds
is not new or confined to transactions with private funds.”).
125. See Alexander Dyck, Paul Martins Manoel & Adair Morse, Outraged by Compensation:
Implications for Public Pension Performance 13, 28 (unpublished manuscript),
http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/morse/research/papers/DyckMorseManoel.pdf
(finding
that
constraints on public plan compensation negatively impact fund performance); Christine
Williamson, Pension Funds Face Challenge in Recruitment, PENSIONS & INVS. (Apr. 1, 2019, 1:00
AM),
https://www.pionline.com/article/20190401/PRINT/190409985/pension-funds-facechallenge-in-recruitment (“[T]he compensation differential between pension fund investment
management and [private sector] money managers is an ever-present issue in recruiting top
talent . . . .”); Arleen Jacobius, Public CIO Pay Getting Renewed Attention, PENSIONS & INVS. (July
23, 2018, 1:00 AM), https://www.pionline.com/article/20180723/PRINT/180729976/public-ciopay-getting-renewed-attention (“[P]ublic pension plan [chief investment officers] make a fraction
of what they could make at a corporate pension fund, endowment, foundation or money
management firm.”); Madison Marriage, Pension Pay Dilemma Becomes Acute, FIN. TIMES (Feb.
7, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/af31b7a4-ad39-11e4-bfcf-00144feab7de (“Generous
executive pay at pension schemes is controversial, especially when members face reductions in
benefits[.]”).
126. Research shows that politically appointed trustees make less effective pension management
decisions. See, e.g., Bradley et al., supra note 121, at 88; Aleksandar Andonov, Yael V. Hochberg
& Joshua D. Rauh, Political Representation and Governance: Evidence from the Investment
Decisions of Public Pension Funds, 73 J. FIN. 2041, 2084 (2018) (“In the public pension context,
the presence of politicians on boards appears to work against pension funds’ primary objective of
delivering the benefits promised to the participants as efficiently as possible for taxpayers.”); Simon
C.Y. Wong, Public Pension Funds Perform Better When They Keep Politics at Bay, HARV. BUS.
REV. (July 19, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/07/public-pension-funds-perform-better-when-theykeep-politics-at-bay (“Interference by elected officials—from imposition of local economic
development obligations to excessive constraints on head count and compensation that impede
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public pension plans to compete with private sector employees for talented
personnel to manage their plan’s investments.
2. State and Local Pension History of Underfunding
The issues above are compounded by a history of questionable funding
practices by state and local pension plans. At the time that public pension
plans began building large investment positions in private equity, many state
and local plans were also experiencing significant funding shortfalls127 that
attracted widespread attention from scholars and critics.128 This history of
underfunding exacerbates concerns about pension underperformance
because when a plan is underfunded, it makes the margin for error even
smaller. Investment losses will more quickly result in a state cutting certain
services for vulnerable residents and/or raising taxes on residents in the state.
Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, it was estimated that state and local
pension plans had unfunded liabilities worth multiple trillions of dollars.129
While some states had healthy funding levels, the gap between well-funded
plans and poorly-funded plans had never been wider.130 As will be discussed
below, recent market events have led to improvements in many public plans’
funding status across the nation, but problems in individual states and
localities still remain, and there is reason to be wary that the improved status
may be delicate.131

recruitment of talented staff—has contributed to poor investment choices, higher total costs,
diminished organizations, and disappointing performance . . . .”).
127. For extensive national statistics on the funding status of state and local pension funding
across the country between 2002 and 2017, see EFA: State Pensions, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE
FED. RSRV. SYS., https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/dataviz/pension/ (last updated Dec.
18, 2020).
128. See infra notes 132–134 and accompanying text.
129. Specific estimates vary depending on accounting assumptions. See e.g., Thurston Powers,
Bob Williams & Jonathan Williams, Unaccountable and Unaffordable 2018, AM. LEGIS. EXCH.
COUNCIL (Mar. 20, 2019), https://www.alec.org/publication/unaccountable-and-unaffordable2018/ (estimating unfunded liabilities of approximately $6 trillion); Hidden Debt, Hidden Deficits:
The 2019 Update, Hoover Institution, Stanford University (June 11, 2019),
https://www.hoover.org/news/hidden-debt-hidden-deficits-2019-update (estimating unfunded
liabilities of approximately $4 trillion); The State Pension Funding Gap: 2017, PEW CHARITABLE
TRS.
2,
4
(June
2019),
https://www.pewtrusts.org//media/assets/2019/06/statepensionfundinggap.pdf [hereinafter Pew Brief June 2019] (estimating
unfunded liabilities of approximately $1.28 trillion).
130. See Pew Brief June 2019, supra note 129, at 1 (noting that “the disparity between wellfunded public pension systems and those that are fiscally strained ha[d] never been greater”).
131. See Liz Farmer, Stock Market Helps State Pension Debt Hit 10-Year Low, but Crisis Still
Looms
Large,
FORBES
(Sept.
23,
2021,
10:15
AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/lizfarmer/2021/09/23/stock-market-helps-state-pension-debt-hit-10year-low-but-crisis-still-looms-large/.
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Underfunding has been a prominent source of concern for many
academics and policymakers over the years,132 with many projecting serious
problems for cities and states that persistently fail to make sufficient
contributions.133 Prior to the pandemic, several studies suggested that high
pension costs had started to crowd out investments in areas like education,
welfare, and infrastructure in some jurisdictions.134 Even the most optimistic
of scholarly commentators were acknowledging that a significant percentage
of public plans would require enormous contribution increases to avoid
serious problems.135 This history of underfunding has generated concerns
about intergenerational fairness, as future generations of taxpayers are the
ones who have to bear the burden of increased taxes and/or reduced state
services in the wake of prolonged underfunding.136
As noted above, recent market events have led to a sudden, dramatic
improvement in the funding status of public pension plans across the country.
According to Pew Charitable Trusts, the aggregate projected funded ratio for
state and local plans across the country was 69% in 2020 (the second-lowest
funded ratio since the financial crisis of 2008), but by 2021 the projected ratio
had swung to 84% (the highest funded ratio since the financial crisis of
132. In many states, pension debt has vastly exceeded other forms of debt over the years. In
Illinois, for example, state and local governments had $466 billion of unfunded pension obligations
before the pandemic, which tripled their bond debt of $155 billion. See Mary Williams Walsh, As
Virus Ravages Budgets, States Cut and Borrow for Balance, N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/14/business/virus-state-budgets.html.
133. See, e.g., John Mauldin, The Coming Pension Crisis Is So Big that It’s a Problem for
Everyone,
FORBES
(May
20,
2019,
9:47
AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnmauldin/2019/05/20/the-coming-pension-crisis-is-so-big-thatits-a-problem-for-everyone/?sh=376bab6637fc; America’s Public Pension Funding Crisis
Worsens,
ECONOMIST
(June
4,
2020),
https://www.economist.com/finance-andeconomics/2020/06/04/americas-public-pension-funding-crisis-worsens.
134. See, e.g., TRACY GORDON ET AL., URBAN INST., FISCAL DEMOCRACY IN THE STATES:
HOW
MUCH
SPENDING
IS
ON
AUTOPILOT?
19,
26
(2019),
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/100728/fiscal_democracy_in_the_states_how
_much_spending_is_on_autopilot_6.pdf; Pew Brief June 2019, supra note 129, at 2 (noting that
“[p]ension contributions went up 424 percent in Illinois, 267 percent in Kentucky, and more than
100 percent in New Jersey from 2007 to 2017, reducing resources available for other important
public priorities”); Sarah Anzia, A Silent Pension Crisis is Eating Away Local Government
Services. Here’s What You Need to Know, WASH. POST (Aug. 5, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/08/05/silent-pension-crisis-is-eating-away-localgovernment-services-heres-what-you-need-know/.
135. See Jamie Lenney et al., The Sustainability of State and Local Government Pensions: A
Public Finance Approach, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, Spring 2021, at 1, 3,
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/15872-BPEA-SP21_WEB_Lenney-etal.pdf (noting that while their findings do not suggest an imminent crisis for most pension plans,
“there is significant heterogeneity across plans, with some plans requiring large contribution
increases to achieve stability”).
136. See Christian Gollier, Intergenerational Risk-Sharing and Risk-Taking of a Pension Fund,
92 J. PUB. ECON. 1463 (2008); GORDON ET AL., supra note 134, at vii–viii.
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2008).137 Even though contribution rates by public plans have gotten better
in recent years,138 the improvement in funding status was driven almost
entirely by an unprecedented run-up in the stock market, with the S&P 500
swinging from approximately 2,300 in March 2020 to over 4,500 by
September 2021.139 However, even though these returns have greatly
improved funding ratios in the short run, they have also led experts to
decrease long-term expected annual returns in the industry dramatically.140
In fact, as of 2021, the returns that public pension plans are assuming their
plans will achieve on their investments are a full percentage point lower than
the returns that experts project are actually realistic.141 Accordingly, in
coming years, to maintain fiscal health, state and local pensions will likely
need to achieve a much higher percentage of their growth through
contributions rather than investment returns.
B. These Factors Have Actually Shaped the SEC’s Approach to Private
Equity
As noted above, private equity funds generally qualify for exemptions
to each of the federal securities laws, except for the requirement that
managers register under the Advisers Act. This requirement to register under
the Advisers Act is a relatively recent phenomenon. Just over a decade ago,
it was relatively easy for private investment funds to avoid registering and
remain almost entirely off the agency’s radar.142 But following the financial
137. The State Pension Funding Gap: Plans Have Stabilized in Wake of Pandemic 4, PEW
CHARITABLE
TRS.
(Sept.
2021),
https://www.pewtrusts.org//media/assets/2021/09/the_state_pension_funding_gap.pdf [hereinafter Pew Brief Sept. 2021].
138. See id. at 1 (noting that “contribution increases, which came after years of states
shortchanging their systems, are part of an upward trend over the past 10 years”).
139. See
S&P
500
(ÙGSPC),
YAHOO!
FIN,
https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/%5EGSPC?p=%5EGSPC (last visited Dec. 13, 2021).
Importantly, the stock market’s poor performance in early 2022 has reversed some of these
gains. See Heather Gillers, Pensions’ Bad Year Poised to Get Worse, WALL ST. J. (May 10, 2022),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/pensions-bad-year-poised-to-get-worse11652175002#:~:text=Quarterly%20public%20pension%20returns%20last,pandemic%20sent%20
markets%20into%20turmoil. (discussing the negative returns faced by public plans in the first
quarter of 2022).
140. See Pew Brief Sept. 2021, supra note 137, at 6 (“[D]ownward adjustments to the outlook
for these asset classes mean that we expect the typical pension fund to return approximately 6%
annually over the next 20 years.”).
141. See id. (noting that Pew Charitable Trusts’ expected long-term return of 6% “is significantly
lower than historical long-term returns of 8% . . . and a full percentage point lower than the current
average assumed rate of return for state-sponsored retirement funds of around 7%”).
142. Pursuant to the now defunct “private adviser exemption,” any investment adviser that had
fewer than fifteen clients and that did not hold itself out to the public as an investment adviser could
avoid registration with the SEC. Now, the set of exemptions is much narrower and nearly all private
fund advisers of substantial size must register with the SEC.
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crisis of 2008, Congress amended the Advisers Act so that most private
equity managers have to register with the SEC and are subject to regular
examinations by the agency.143 In fact, in the early-2010s, the SEC even
established a special unit entirely dedicated to examining private funds,144
and it has maintained a robust presence ever since, examining hundreds of
private equity fund managers each year.145 In effect, this Private Funds
Unit146 serves as a full-time police presence in the industry.147 During the
initial wave of examinations, the Private Funds Unit found many problematic
industry practices,148 and they expressed particular concern for what they
perceived as a widespread lack of transparency with investors.149
Following these changes, the SEC received questions about why it had
established such a robust regulatory presence in a market that was exclusively
limited to investors that were (or should have been) sophisticated. In
response, the SEC repeatedly invoked the massive presence of public pension
plans in the industry.150 When explaining why the poor governance practices
found in the examinations described above were so problematic, the SEC
repeatedly noted as an explanatory rationale that poor governance in private
funds directly harms the public employees whose retirements are invested in
public pension plans.151 Other prominent public figures have made similar
143. See Private Fund Adviser Overview, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Oct. 21, 2016),
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/guidance/private-fund-adviser-resources.htm
(“The
Dodd-Frank Act replaced the old ‘private adviser’ exemption with narrower exemptions for advisers
that advise exclusively venture capital funds and advisers solely to private funds with less than $150
million in assets under management in the United States.”).
144. See Greg Roumeliotis & Sarah N. Lynch, Exclusive: SEC Forms Squad to Examine Private
Funds – Sources, REUTERS (Apr. 7, 2014. 6:55 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-secprivatefunds/exclusive-sec-forms-squad-to-examine-private-funds-sourcesidUSBREA360M420140407.
145. See Risk Alert 2020, supra note 40.
146. See Wyatt, supra note 38 (“OCIE has taken another step towards knowledge building and
deeper specialization by creating the Private Funds Unit . . . which is dedicated to examining
advisers to private funds, including private equity advisers.”).
147. See Risk Alert 2020, supra note 40 (“OCIE . . . is frequently asked about its observations
from these examinations as well as common deficiencies and compliance issues. Many of the
deficiencies discussed [in the Risk Alert] may have caused investors in private funds (“investors”)
to pay more in fees and expenses than they should have or resulted in investors not being informed
of relevant conflicts of interest . . . .”).
148. See, e.g., Bowden, supra note 15 (noting that “violations of law or material weaknesses in
controls” were found in over 50% of managers examined, and that managers regularly charged
“hidden fees that [we]re not adequately disclosed to investors” and shifted expenses to investors
“without proper disclosure that [those] costs [were] being shifted to investors”).
149. Id. (“Lack of transparency and limited investor rights have been the norm in private equity
for a very long time.”).
150. Id. (“The biggest investors in private equity include public and private pension funds,
endowments and foundations, which account for 64% of all investment in private equity in 2012.”).
151. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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comments about the engagement of public pension plans in private
investment funds.152
More recently, regulatory concerns about private equity have been
revived during the tenure of Chair Gary Gensler. At various times in 2021,
Chair Gensler raised many familiar concerns about private equity funds and
indicated that the SEC was considering additional regulatory interventions to
mitigate conflicts of interest and increase transparency in the industry.153 In
defense of these possible changes, Chair Gensler repeatedly referenced the
benefits they would bring to public pension plans and pension
beneficiaries,154 echoing the justifications raised by former SEC officials for
regulatory scrutiny of private equity.
Then, in February 2022, the SEC released a rulemaking proposal that,
if implemented, will dramatically increase mandatory disclosure in the
industry and impose other unprecedented interventions.155 As observed by
Hester Peirce, the lone commissioner who voted against the proposal, these
changes mark a “sea change” in the SEC’s approach to private investment
funds.156 Once again, the commissioners’ comments in support of the
proposal,157 and the language of the proposal itself,158 suggest that concern
for public pension plans and their stakeholders are one of the SEC’s driving
motivations for introducing the proposed changes.

152. See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite? A Flesh-and-Blood
Perspective on Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System, 126 YALE
L.J. 1870, 1936 (2017) (“Many pension funds are not in fact well positioned to prudently select
hedge funds or other non-registered investments and may be attracted to those types of investments
because they have not prudently funded and invested the pension fund in the past. Thus, they chase
the impossible dream of using above-market returns to fill a hole left by previous underinvestment
and poor investing, creating a probability that when the impossible dream does not come true, the
hole is even larger.”).
153. See Gensler, Remarks at ILPA Summit, supra note 16 (“I have asked the staff to consider
what recommendations they could make to bring greater transparency to fee arrangements. . . . I’ve
asked staff how we can better mitigate the effects of conflicts of interest between general partners,
their affiliates, and investors. This could include considering the need for prohibitions on certain
conflicts and practices.”).
154. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
155. See infra Section VI.A.1.
156. Hester M. Peirce, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement on Proposed Private
Fund Advisers; Documentation of Investment Adviser Compliance Reviews Rulemaking (Feb. 9,
2022) (transcript available at https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/peirce-statement-proposedprivate-fund-advisers-020922) (“Today’s proposal represents a sea change. It embodies a belief
that many sophisticated institutions and high net worth individuals are not competent or assertive
enough to obtain and analyze the information they need to make good investment decisions or to
structure appropriately their relationships with private funds.”).
157. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
158. See Feb. 2022 SEC Proposed Rule, supra note 19.
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V. EFFECT #3: IMPLICATIONS FOR CAPITAL FORMATION DYNAMICS IN
PRIVATE EQUITY
A. Investors Have Complained of a Manager’s Market for Contract
Terms for Years
The private equity industry has enjoyed a remarkable run of fundraising
success over the past two decades.159 Private equity managers have benefited
from several factors working in their favor, including a long period of low
interest rates. Low interest rates have helped to increase the returns of
leveraged investment strategies, and they have also incentivized institutional
investors to look for riskier investments to compensate for low returns in
fixed income markets.
One common complaint from institutional investors is that, with so
many investors looking to allocate capital to private equity and the perception
that only a select group of managers can achieve outperformance, they are
hesitant to negotiate aggressively against managers for fear of being “frozen
out” of their funds. Institutional investors have commonly held the view that
if they push back too hard on governance terms, the high-performing
managers will be happy to give their place in the fund to someone else.160
Investors report that this concern is exacerbated by the fact that there is only
a limited number of private equity fund managers with attractive track
records, giving these managers greater confidence that they can push back
and still have potential clients.161
Many investors claim that this dynamic has led to an equilibrium where
private equity fund governance terms throughout the market have become
increasingly favorable to managers over time162—a factor that could help to
explain the SEC’s problematic findings in the mid-2010s163 and more
recently.164 Another way to describe this complaint is that capital formation

159. See Private Markets 2021: A Year of Disruption, MCKINSEY & COMPANY 11 (Apr. 2021),
https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/private-equity-and-principal-investors/ourinsights/mckinseys-private-markets-annual-review (reporting that private market assets under
management have grown by $4 trillion in the past decade, an increase of 170%).
160. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
161. See, e.g., Preeti Singh, Coming to Terms: Private-Equity Investors Face Rising Costs, Extra
Fees, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 20, 2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/coming-to-terms-private-equityinvestors-face-rising-costs-extra-fees-11640001604 (quoting an institutional investor as saying:
“I’m agreeing to expenses and terms that are far more adverse since I started investing 15 years
ago . . . . But what can I do? If I create a fuss I won’t get a seat at the table.”).
162. See supra notes 21–22 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 149–151 and accompanying text.
164. See supra note 40.
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has been too easy for managers in private equity, enabling them to push for
imbalanced terms without losing significant market share.165
The enormous shift of public pension capital to private equity funds has
certainly contributed to the high demand for private equity fund investments
over the years. Interestingly, a large body of research suggests that state and
local pension plans had perverse incentives to over-invest in risky
investments like private equity funds for many years.166
B. Incentives to Increase Risk Rather Than Raise Taxes or Cut Services
Defined benefit public pension plans know in advance the amount of
future liabilities that they are required to satisfy. If a plan is lagging behind
in saving for those future liabilities, the officials running that public plan have
a few options. One is to increase taxes and direct the additional cash flow to
pension fund assets. For obvious reasons, however, publicly elected officials
will often find this option unattractive, as voters are likely to be sensitive to
tax increases. Another option would be to cut other tax-funded services and
redirect the funds to the pension plan. This will often be similarly
unattractive, as public officials will risk losing the support of voters who were
the recipients of those services. Doing this may also be socially suboptimal
if the terminated services were providing a useful social function.
Another option—one that may be more politically palatable—would be
to increase the risk of the plan’s investment portfolio, including by investing
in assets like private equity. By increasing risk, public officials can increase
the expected future return of the portfolio without increasing taxes or cutting
other government-sponsored services. As noted above, many scholars have
criticized public plans for over-investing in risky assets over the years,
arguing that it makes public pension systems vulnerable to market
165. Traditional law and economics theory would predict that governance terms should not
change as bargaining power shifts in a contracting setting. However, industry participants generally
agree that this is not how things work in the private equity industry. For a detailed discussion of
this phenomenon, see Clayton, supra note 89.
166. See generally Novy-Marx & Rauh, supra note 65; Jeffrey R. Brown & David W. Wilcox,
Discounting State and Local Pension Liabilities, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 538 (2009); Robert NovyMarx & Joshua D. Rauh, Public Pension Liabilities: How Big Are They and What Are They Worth?,
66 J. FIN. 1207 (2011) [hereinafter Novy-Marx & Rauh, Public Pension Liabilities]; Alicia H.
Munnell, Jean-Pierre Aubrey & Mark Cafarelli, The Funding of State and Local Pensions: 2013–
2017,
CTR.
FOR
RET.
RSCH.
AT
B.C.
5
(2014),
https://crr.bc.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2014/06/slp_39.pdf; Odd J. Stalebrink, Public Pension Funds and Assumed Rates
of Return: An Empirical Examination of Public Sector Defined Benefit Pension Plans, 44 AM. REV.
PUB. ADMIN. 92 (2014); Robert Novy-Marx & Joshua D. Rauh, Linking Benefits to Investment
Performance in U.S. Public Pension Systems, 116 J. PUB. ECON. 47 (2014); Andonov et al., supra
note 57; Jeffrey Diebold, Vincent Reitano & Bruce McDonald, Sweat the Small Stuff: Strategic
Selection of Pension Policies Used to Defer Required Contributions, 36 CONTEMP. ECON. POL’Y
505 (2017).
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downturns.167 This incentive to increase public pension risk-taking beyond
what would otherwise be prudent has been characterized as “gambling” with
public finances by various commentators,168 judges,169 and popular media
sources.170 Nevertheless, to the extent that voters are likely to be less
sensitive to excessive investment portfolio risk than tax increases and cuts in
government services, public officials will have an additional incentive to take
on risk.
Notably, public pension investment in private assets has been steadily
increasing in the wake of the pandemic.171 While it is difficult to determine
how much of this activity is being driven by the kinds of incentives described
above versus other objectives,172 these non-market incentives are a fact of life
in the public pension context.
C. Public Pension Accounting Rules Long Incentivized OverInvestment in Risky Assets Like Private Equity
Looking back over the past two decades, the incentives described above
were further exacerbated for many years by public sector accounting rules.
These rules allowed state and local officials to obscure underfunding
problems and reduce their required pension contributions by investing in
risky assets.173 Efforts were made in the mid-2010s to reform those rules,
though some critics argue that perverse incentives to invest in risky
investments like private equity still remain.174 Studies have shown that over
the years there was a link between the increased investment in risky assets by

167. See supra notes 63–65 and accompanying text.
168. Tenreiro, supra note 67.
169. See, e.g., supra note 152.
170. See, e.g., Gaviria et al., supra note 69.
171. See Gillers, supra note 5 (“Government retirement funds are pumping record sums into
private equity, defying concerns about risk and cost as they try to plug pension shortfalls.”); Harriet
Agnew & Josephine Cumbo, Pension Funds Seek Returns in Private Assets as Public Market
Outlook Dims, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2021), https://www.ft.com/content/e4ae2283-0787-4f57-a23caa43d55c6745 (“Large funding deficits are driving pension plans to plough money into private
assets in pursuit of returns, heightening the risk of crowded trades and subdued gains . . . .”).
172. For example, given low interest rates and high stock valuations in the current market,
alternative investment options are limited.
173. See infra Section V.C.2.
174. See, e.g., Deborah Lucas, Towards Fair Value Accounting for Public Pensions: The Case
for Delinking Disclosure and Funding Requirements 5 (Oct. 2017) (unpublished manuscript),
http://mitsloan.mit.edu/shared/ods/documents/?PublicationDocumentID=4595 (criticizing GASB
67 and 68 because they “le[ave] plan sponsors with discretion over how to determine expected
returns and how to define what constitutes an unfunded liability for purposes of discount rate
determination”).
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state and local plans and the magnitude of those plans’ underfunding
problems.175
1. Where Public Pension Accounting Rules Come From
Accounting standards in the United States are promulgated by private,
nonprofit organizations. The standards for private sector businesses are
established by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (“FASB”), and the
standards for state and local governments are set by the Governmental
Accounting Standards Board (“GASB”). On the surface, these organizations
have much in common.176 However, notwithstanding some of these
similarities, GASB’s authority (or lack thereof) is much different than
FASB’s. All private sector entities that are subject to the federal securities
laws are legally required to observe FASB’s standards.177 FASB is also
subject to oversight by the SEC. By contrast, state and local governments
can choose to follow GASB’s standards, but they are under no obligation to
do so.178 GASB also operates free from SEC oversight.

175. See, e.g., Andonov et al., supra note 57, at 2560 (“We find that U.S. public pension funds
with a higher level of underfunding per participant invest more in risky assets and use higher liability
discount rates, consistent with our intuition that these pension funds have stronger incentives to
report a lower funding deficit and reduce the required contribution payments today.”); Paul Rose &
Jason Seligman, Are Alternative Investments Prudent? Public Sector Pension Use and Fiduciary
Duty, J. ALT. INVS., Winter 2016, at 5, 16 (finding that plans with lower-funded ratios are more
inclined to invest in alternative investments and that the proportion of alternative investments is
“strongly and positively related to investment return assumptions”). These findings are consistent
with a long line of research showing that public plan administrators are more likely to engage in
opportunistic accounting practices in times of fiscal stress. See, e.g., Barbara A. Chaney, Paul A.
Copley & Mary S. Stone, The Effect of Fiscal Stress and Balanced Budget Requirements on the
Funding and Measurement of State Pension Obligations, 21 J. ACCT. & PUB. POL’Y 287 (2002);
Tim V. Eaton & John R. Nofsinger, The Effect of Financial Constraints and Political Pressure on
the Management of Public Pension Plans, 23 J. ACCT. & PUB. POL’Y 161 (2004).
176. For example, the principles released by both organizations are designated as the “Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles” in their respective spheres, and the same parent organization that
appoints directors to the FASB—the Financial Accounting Foundation—also appoints the GASB
directors.
See generally About the GASB, GOVERNMENTAL ACCT. STANDARDS BD.,
https://www.gasb.org/jsp/GASB/Page/GASBSectionPage&cid=1176168081485 (Sept. 2021). The
two organizations even share the same building and mailing address. See id.
177. See Mary Jo White, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at the Financial
Accounting Foundation Trustees Dinner (May 20, 2014) (transcript available at
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2014-spch052014mjw) (“Because accounting standards adopted
by the FASB are the core of the financial reporting required by the federal securities laws, a strong
relationship between the SEC and FASB is vital.”).
178. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT ON THE MUNICIPAL SECURITIES MARKET iv
(2012), https://www.sec.gov/files/munireport073112.pdf (“There are no uniformly applied
accounting standards in the municipal securities market and the Commission generally lacks
authority to prescribe the accounting standards that municipal issuers must use.”).
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Many have argued that these structural differences weakened GASB’s
ability to pass strong and effective standards out of fear that cities and states
would opt out of GASB standards if they were too rigorous and adopt their
own.179 Even though GASB standards have been criticized by various
scholars and industry commentators over the years,180 they have been widely
followed by state and local governments.181
2. How GASB Rules Incentivized Risk-Taking
a. Original Rules: GASB 25 and 27
Prior to 2014, GASB 25182 and 27183 governed the reporting of pension
liabilities by cities and states. Under these standards, state and local
governments were instructed to fund pension liabilities so that the expected
future value of pension assets equaled the expected future value of pension
liabilities. Accordingly, when reporting the amount of pension liabilities that
they had promised to public employees, cities and states following GASB
were instructed to report the discounted present value of those liabilities. The

179. See, e.g., James Naughton & Holger Spamann, Fixing Public Sector Finances: The
Accounting and Reporting Lever, 62 UCLA L. REV. 572, 579 (“Some have speculated that [poor
decision-making by GASB] is due to incompetence or capture by the regulated public entities from
where GASB’s members hail.”); Israel Klein, It’s Time to Mind the GASB, 54 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
565, 591 (2017) (noting that GASB is “incentivized to relax stringent disclosure requirements in
order to induce adoption”); Theresa A. Gabaldon, Financial Federalism and the Short, Happy Life
of Municipal Securities Regulation, 34 J. CORP. L. 739, 752 (2009) (noting that GASB “has been
criticized as being subject to regulatory capture”); George P. Shultz & David G. Crane, It’s Time
for Truth in State and Local Government Finances, CITYWATCH (Aug. 19, 2019),
https://www.citywatchla.com/index.php/2016-01-01-13-17-00/los-angeles/18276-it-s-time-fortruth-in-state-and-local-government-finances (noting that at GASB, it is “much easier for the
regulated to control their regulator” than in other settings).
180. See, e.g., Terrance O’Reilly, A Public Pensions Bailout: Economics and Law, 48 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 183, 194 (2014) (“GASB’s standards . . . are significantly looser than those that
ERISA imposes on private sector plans.”); Naughton & Spamann, supra note 179, at 574 (arguing
that GASB standards are outdated and ineffective and in need of fixing).
181. See Natalya Shnitser, Funding Discipline for U.S. Public Pension Plans: An Empirical
Analysis of Institutional Design, 100 IOWA L. REV. 663, 671 (2015) (“Although GASB standards
are not federal law and GASB has no enforcement authority, its reporting standards are generally
recognized by state and local governments as authoritative . . . .”); Naughton & Spamann, supra
note 179, at 576 (“Most U.S. states and local entities prepare financial reports in accordance with a
separate set of GAAP developed by the [GASB].”).
182. Government Accounting Standards Rule 25, “Financial Reporting for Defined Benefit
Pension Plans and Note Disclosures for Defined Contribution Plans,” was adopted in November
1994 and is summarized at http://www. gasb.org/st/summary/gstsm25.html.
183. Actuarial Standard of Practice #27, “Selection of Economic Assumptions for Measuring
Pension
Obligations,”
was
adopted
September
2007
and
is
available
at
http://actuarialstandardsboard.org/pdf/asops/asop027_109.pdf.
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appropriate discount rate, according to GASB 25 and 27, was the expected
return of the assets held in the pension plan’s investment portfolio.184
Under these rules, the amount that cities and states were required to
contribute to their pension plans in any given year was based on this
discounted liability figure—so the smaller the discounted liability, the less
the city or state would have to contribute to its plans. Thus, by causing a plan
to invest in riskier assets, city and state officials could reduce the size of the
required contribution to be made by the government, thereby opening up
funds to be allocated to other items in the budget.185 And, since they were
only required to publicly report the discounted value of the liabilities, city
and state officials could also make their unfunded liabilities appear smaller
to the public by investing in a higher percentage of pension portfolios in risky
assets.186
The GASB 25 and 27 approach was inconsistent with basic finance
theory and was roundly rejected by economists.187 The only way to increase
the expected return of a pension plan’s investment portfolio was to invest the
plan’s assets in riskier investments. When a pension plan is invested in risky
assets, the average expected returns are higher than if the plan were invested
in low-risk assets, but there is also a higher chance that the risky investments
will produce far lower returns than expected, or no returns at all.188
Studies suggest that using a higher discount rate to calculate the present
value of public pension obligations had a significant impact on actual funding
practices for many years. According to one estimate, if states had to discount
their obligations using a risk-free rate, their reported unfunded liabilities

184. See Novy-Marx & Rauh, Public Pension Liabilities, supra note 166, at 1211 (“Government
Accounting Standards Board (GASB) ruling 25 and Actuarial Standards of Practice (ASOP) item
27 stipulate that public pension liabilities are to be discounted at the expected rate of return on
pension assets.”).
185. See Eileen Norcross & Emily Washington, The Crisis in State and Local Pensions,
MERCATUS CTR. AT GEORGE MASON UNIV. 2, https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/NorcrossPensions-CrisisEP.pdf (last visited Mar. 16, 2022) (“Using a high discount rate lowers the [annual
required contribution] to pension funds.”).
186. See Andonov et al., supra note 57, at 2555 (noting that “[t]he unique regulation of U.S.
public pension funds links their liability discount rate to the expected return on assets, which gives
them incentives to invest more in risky assets in order to report a better funding status”).
187. See Jeffrey R. Brown & David W. Wilcox, supra note 166, at 538 (“Finance theory is
unambiguous that the discount rate used to value future pension obligations should reflect the
riskiness of the liabilities.”).
188. See Lucas, supra note 174, at 8–9 (“A more charitable interpretation of the GASB rule is
that it is being used to create estimates that answer a distinctly different question, which is: How
much has to be set aside today so that on average investment returns cover projected benefit
payments? It implicitly assumes that the right funding policy is to hold an amount of assets that on
average will be sufficient to meet obligations over time, while allowing that other sources of
government revenue may have to be redirected if returns prove to be inadequate.”).
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would have gone up dramatically, their funded ratios189 would have
plummeted, and their annual required contribution190 (on average) would
have doubled.191 Research has shown that these practices also created a
number of indirect problems as well, distorting the spending and employment
decisions made by state and local governments over the years.192 Instead of
ratcheting back new obligations in response to the burgeoning underfunding
problem in recent decades, states were actually increasing the size of their
new pension liabilities by making retirement packages more generous.193
The massive increase in public pension plans’ investments in risky
assets—including private equity funds—over the past two decades was thus
part of a much broader and more complex story.

189. Funded ratios show the percentage of a public pension plan’s liabilities that are backed by
actual funds in the plan.
190. The “annual required contribution” refers to the amount under GASB 25 and 27 that a
public employer must pay into its pension fund to cover the cost of benefits accrued in that year to
pay off any unaccrued unfunded liabilities in no more than thirty years. See GOVERNMENTAL ACCT.
STANDARDS BD., GUIDE TO IMPLEMENTATION OF GASB STATEMENTS 25, 26, AND 27 ON PENSION
REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE BY STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT PLANS AND EMPLOYERS:
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 13–15 (1997).
191. See Diebold et al., supra note 166, at 507 (“If states were required to discount their
obligations using a riskless rate unfunded liabilities estimates would increase by 210%, funded
ratios would decline by 33%, and the ARC from states would double, on average.”).
192. Research has shown that these accounting issues distorted the spending and employment
decisions made by state and local governments over the years. By giving the impression that future
pension benefits required lower annual contribution amounts than was realistic, GASB accounting
made state and local employees appear less expensive than they actually were. For example,
Naughton et al. empirically showed that this led states to overinvest in public sector workers relative
to the resources that they had available. They constructed a dataset consisting of reported GASB
pension costs from 1990–2009 and the amount that the pension costs would have been if states had
been required to use the FASB discounting rules. Their regression results show that the larger the
difference between the costs calculated under the GASB method and the FASB method,
respectively, for any time period, the more likely states were to over-invest in workers during that
time period. See James Naughton, Reining Petacchi & Joseph Weber, Public Pension Accounting
Rules and Economic Outcomes, 59 J. ACCT. & ECON. 221, 239 (2015) (“We also find that pension
understatements are associated with higher future labor costs. Importantly, we find that the positive
relation between pension funding gap understatement and future labor costs is associated with the
inherent methodology in the GASB rules, which systematically understate the funding gap . . . .”).
193. See Robert Clark et al., The Evolution of Public Sector Pension Plans in the United States,
in THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS 239, 256 (Olivia S. Mitchell & Gary
Anderson eds., 2009) (“The main story of the past three decades has been the increased generosity
of state retirement plans. States have reduced the normal retirement age, increased the generosity
parameters, and reduced the number of years in the averaging period. As a result, replacement rates
[the percentage of a worker’s pre-retirement income paid after retirement] have risen
significantly.”).
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b. Updated Rules: GASB 67 and 68
Due in part to widespread scholarly criticism of GASB 25 and 27,194
GASB released updated standards that went into effect in 2013 and 2014,
respectively.195 Under GASB 67 and 68, public plans are supposed to use a
“blended” discount rate when discounting pension liabilities to present value.
Instead of using the expected rate of return of the assets in the plan’s
investment portfolio to discount all of the plan’s liabilities, GASB 67 and 68
direct plans to use the expected return only to the extent that the plan’s assets
are projected to be sufficient to satisfy benefit payments. To the extent that
the plan’s actuaries project that there will be an unfunded balance of benefit
payments after the plan’s assets are depleted, plans are supposed to use a
high-quality, tax-exempt municipal bond rate to discount that balance.
Because public pension plans invest so much of their portfolios in risky
assets, a municipal bond rate is significantly lower than the expected return
of most plans. As a result, for plans that project to have unfunded balances,
applying this lower interest rate results in higher liability figures than if the
higher rate were applied to all of the plan’s liabilities.
Another significant change introduced by GASB 67 and 68 related to
the presentation of pension liabilities. Under GASB 67 and 68, if there is a
net pension liability after subtracting the fair value of pension assets from the
pension obligation (as measured following the approach above), it must be
recognized in the financial statements of state and local governments. Under
GASB 25 and 27, disclosure of this figure was only required in the footnotes
to the financial statements.196
GASB 67 and 68, which are the rules that still apply to public pension
plans, have generally been viewed as an improvement, but not a complete
solution, to the problems observed in GASB 25 and 27.197 Critics have
194. See, e.g., supra note 166 and accompanying text.
195. Government Accounting Standards Rule 67, “Financial Reporting for Pension Plans—An
Amendment of GASB Statement No. 25,” went into effect on June 15, 2013, and is summarized at
https://www.gasb.org/jsp/GASB/Pronouncement_C/GASBSummaryPage&cid=1176160219444.
Government Accounting Standards Rule 68, “Accounting and Financial Reporting for Pensions—
An Amendment of GASB Statement No. 27,” went into effect on June 15, 2014, and is summarized
at
https://www.gasb.org/jsp/GASB/Pronouncement_C/GASBSummaryPage&cid=1176160219492.
196. See Divya Anantharaman & Elizabeth Chuk, The Impact of Governmental Accounting
Standards on Public-Sector Pension Funding 3 (July 8, 2020) (unpublished manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3438074 (“[A]ny net pension liability
determined by subtracting the fair value of pension assets from the pension obligation . . . is to be
recognized on the financial statements of state and local governments for the first time. Prior to
these changes, GASB standards only required footnote disclosure of the unfunded liability.”).
197. See Lucas, supra note 174 (“It is fair to say that GASB 67 was a major disappointment for
proponents of accounting reform. . . . Despite its shortcomings, GASB 67 deserves credit for
opening the door to accounting reform.”).
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argued that because the expected return of a plan’s investment portfolio is
still used under the new rules, state and local plans continue to have
incentives to over-invest in risky assets to obfuscate their underfunding
problems notwithstanding the passage of GASB 67 and 68.198 Thus, while
GASB 67 and 68 are better than GASB 25 and 27,199 scholars and
policymakers generally agree that public sector accounting still has
significant room for improvement.200
VI. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
A. Private Equity Regulation
1. The February 2022 SEC Proposed Rule
Publicly-traded companies must comply with an extraordinarily
detailed set of mandatory disclosure rules and processes when they raise

198. Studies show that state and local governments have used the discretion granted to them
under GASB 67 and 68 to project that their assets will be sufficient to fund all liabilities. See Sheila
Weinberg & Eileen Norcross, GASB 67 and GASB 68: What the New Accounting Standards Mean
for
Public
Pension
Reporting,
MERCATUS
ON
POL’Y
(June
2017),
https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/mercatus-weinberg-gasb-67-68-mop-2017-v1.pdf (noting
that Kentucky and Illinois did not apply the blended rate to some of their largest pension plans,
notwithstanding the fact that the pension in these states were among the worst-funded in the
country).
199. Some more recent studies have found that GASB 67 and 68 have benefited public pension
governance. One study found that funding contributions by state and local governments to their
plans has gone up since 2014. See Anantharaman & Chuk, supra note 196, at 5. Another found
that after the introduction of GASB 67 and 68, housing prices in counties from states with larger
pension liabilities as a percentage of total GDP have grown more slowly relative to their adjacent
counties, suggesting that homebuyers have been factoring the burden of state pension liabilities into
the amount they are willing to pay for their homes. See Grace Haoqing Fan, Economic
Consequences of Public Pension Accounting Rule Changes: Evidence from Housing Markets and
Local
Economies
36
(Jan.
2020)
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://d30i16bbj53pdg.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/FAN_Grace_JMP.pdf. While
this study did not examine whether the reported liabilities were accurately calculated, it did show
that the increased visibility of unfunded liabilities in pension financial statements has led to an
increase in public attention on underfunding.
200. See Emily Kessler et al., Better Measurements: Risk Reporting for Public Pension Plans 17
(Harv. Kennedy Sch. Mossavar-Rahmani Ctr. For Bus. & Gov’t, Working Paper No. 128, 2019),
https://www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/centers/mrcbg/working.papers/PENSION_FINAL
%2C%2010july19.pdf (“While recent guidance from the GASB, the ASB, and the BRP has
established a basis for improved reporting that focuses on similar issues and practices, conference
participants agreed that more needs to be done, and acknowledged that most plans disclose few if
any risk measures beyond the liability sensitivity analysis required by the GASB. Moreover, despite
the common themes of guidance from all three organizations, no standard or consistent reporting
requirements for comprehensive risk measurement have yet emerged. Finally, and perhaps most
significantly, though most plans conduct these types of analysis internally, there is little or no risk
reporting provided to or designed for non-fiduciaries.”).
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capital. Historically, if a company or an investment fund qualified for
exemptions to the 1933 Act, the 1934 Act, the Investment Company Act, and
the Advisers Act, that entity’s capital-raising activities were generally left
alone under those statutes. This approach implicitly adhered to the idea that
sophisticated parties can be assumed to bargain for effective terms and to
agree on effective transaction processes without any need for intervention.
As noted above, in the private equity context, this approach took a
significant turn in the early-2010s when the SEC formed the Private Funds
Unit and introduced industry-wide examinations, among other things. 201 In
effect, these policy actions reflected a view from the SEC that a completely
hands-off approach to securities regulation was not working very well in
private equity. As discussed above, public pension plans, and the non-market
influence they have had on the market, help to explain why the SEC’s
approach to private equity has changed as much as it has over the past
decade.202
Those earlier SEC interventions, however, seem rather insignificant
compared to the proposed rules that the SEC released to the public in
February 2022.203 Among other things, the new proposed rules would:
• Require that all private equity fund managers provide investors
with quarterly statements containing detailed information
about fund performance, fees, and expenses; 204
• Require that all private equity fund managers obtain an audit
for each fund that they manage annually and notify the SEC
upon any modification of an auditor’s opinion regarding
financial statements or termination of an auditor’s
engagement; 205
• Prohibit all private fund advisers (including those that are not
registered with the SEC pursuant to the Advisers Act), from
engaging in a robust set of activities and practices that the SEC
views as contrary to the public interest and the protection of
investors (including charging fees for unperformed services
and for expenses associated with an SEC examination or
investigation of the manager); 206 and
• Prohibit all private fund managers (including those that are not
registered with the SEC pursuant to the Advisers Act) from

201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

See supra notes 144–145 and accompanying text.
See supra Section IV.B.
See Feb. 2022 SEC Proposed Rule, supra note 19.
Id. at 17–18.
Id. at 99–100.
Id. at 132–33.
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providing certain forms of preferential treatment that would
have a material negative effect on other investors.207
Notably, in addition to the February 2022 proposed rule, which
primarily regulates the relationship between managers and investors, the SEC
also issued proposed amendments to mandatory reporting requirements on
Form PF to address systemic risk.208 No longer a periodic report, the
proposed amendments would require managers to report changes within one
business day of certain triggering events.209 Similar changes are being
considered by the SEC to require enhanced reporting by large operating
companies as well.210
These proposed changes have prompted significant criticism.211 Critics
argue that interventions are unnecessary and that policymakers should
instead assume that private fund investors will use their resources and
sophistication to make sound investment decisions and structure their
investments effectively.212 While a detailed analysis of the SEC’s proposal
and its critics is beyond the scope of this Article, this Article’s analysis does
raise questions about whether the assumptions underlying these contractarian
criticisms are true.
This Article’s analysis does not, however, suggest that the SEC should
have a blank check to intervene in private funds. As the SEC looks to take
these unprecedented regulatory steps, any future interventions should be
calibrated to respond to the impediments to effective bargaining in private
equity. Establishing clear theory for what those impediments are and how
207. Id. at 162–63; see also Kirkland & Ellis, SEC Proposes Sweeping Rule Changes for Private
Fund Advisers (Feb. 10, 2022), https://www.kirkland.com/publications/kirkland-aim/2022/02/rulechanges-for-private-fund-advisers-1.
208. See supra note 37.
209. See U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Proposed Rule: Amendments to Form PF to Require
Current Reporting and Amend Reporting Requirements for Large Private Equity Advisers and
Large Liquidity Fund Advisers (Jan. 26, 2022), https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2022/ia5950.pdf.
210. See Paul Kiernan, SEC Pushes for More Transparency From Private Companies, WALL
ST. J. (Jan. 10, 2022, 6:00 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-pushes-for-more-transparencyfrom-private-companies-11641752489.
211. See, e.g., Peirce, supra note 156; Editorial Board, The SEC’s Private Market Takeover,
WALL ST. J. (Mar. 15, 2022), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-secs-private-market-takeover-garygensler-hester-peirce-11647375870.
212. See, e.g., Peirce, supra note 156 (“[T]he Commission judges it wise to divert resources from
the protection of retail investors to safeguard these wealthy investors who are represented by
sophisticated, experienced investment professionals. I disagree with both assessments; these wellheeled, well-represented investors are able to fend for themselves, and our resources are better spent
on retail investor protection. . . . [T]he proposal’s focus on protecting private fund investors by
shaking information loose from what we deem to be uncommunicative private funds and shutting
down practices we deem to be unfair is a departure from the Commission’s historical view that these
types of investors can fend for themselves.”).
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they affect bargaining outcomes is an important part of doing this. Yet, as
illustrated by the wide gap between the contractarian views held by the
proposal’s critics and the views of the SEC’s private funds rulemaking staff,
this effort is not easy, particularly given the lack of publicly available
information about how bargaining works in this space. The need for
thoughtful scholarship in this area has thus never been stronger.
2. Special Rules for Public Pension Plans?
Public pension plans raise a distinctive set of issues in private equity
funds. So what if, instead of imposing industry-wide interventions, the SEC
imposed rules that apply only to public plans? Do the distinctive
characteristics of public pension plans justify imposing a special set of
restrictions and/or protections that go beyond the requirements that apply to
other investors? Could the SEC even do this, assuming it wanted to?
One possible option would be for the SEC to use the accredited investor
standard213 to exclude public plans that show severe signs of
mismanagement. If, for example, underfunding and low contribution rates
were to become a sufficiently serious problem across states and localities, the
SEC could adjust the standard to exclude public plans that are failing to
satisfy baseline contribution rates and/or funding ratios. The SEC has
repeatedly indicated that the goal of the accredited investor standard is to
identify “those persons whose financial sophistication and ability to sustain
the risk of loss of investment or ability to fend for themselves render the
protections of the Securities Act’s registration process unnecessary.”214 In
severely underfunded plans, even though state officials have access to
sophisticated advice, it might be fair to question whether they are actually
using those resources to seek the best interests of their pension beneficiaries
and taxpayers. Moreover, as discussed above, when the portfolio of an
underfunded public pension plan performs worse than expected, there is a
good chance that many of the individuals who bear the cost of that
underperformance will be low-income and/or vulnerable residents of the
state.215 With the authority set forth in section 2(a)(15), the SEC could make

213. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
214. Regulation D Revisions; Exemption for Certain Employee Benefit Plans, 52 Fed. Reg.
3015, 3017 (Jan. 30, 1987) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 239).
215. See supra Section IV.A.1.
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updates to the accredited investor definition216 without congressional
approval.217
Changing the accredited investor standard in this way would give public
plans strong ex ante incentives to avoid falling below the specified thresholds
for contribution rates and funding ratios. But this form of regulation would
also be a very blunt instrument for addressing concerns about public pension
plans, and legal challenges would almost certainly follow.218 Given the
challenges associated with affording special regulatory treatment to public
plans, applying different regulatory rules to public pension plans is likely
unrealistic for the SEC.
B. Is Private Equity Too Public to Fail?
With public pension plans so heavily invested in private equity funds,
the fiscal health of state and local governments across the country has become
closely interconnected with—and partially dependent on—the performance
of the private equity industry.219 This raises an interesting question: With so
much public money on the line, how is the federal government likely to
respond when the industry falls on hard times?220
216. In fact, as recently as 2020, the SEC made a number of significant amendments to the
accredited investor definition. See Accredited Investor Definition, 85 Fed. Reg. 64234, 64234 (Oct.
9, 2020) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 240).
217. Section 2(a)(15) of the Securities Act enumerates certain categories of accredited investors,
but that section specifically authorizes the SEC to prescribe additional categories “on the basis of
such factors as financial sophistication, net worth, knowledge, and experience in financial matters,
or amount of assets under management.” 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(15). Public pension plans with assets
in excess of $5 million is one of the categories that was added to the definition of accredited
investors by the SEC. The full accredited investor definition, including all of the additional
categories that have been set forth by the SEC, can be found in Rule 215 of the Securities Act.
Interestingly, ever since 2010, the SEC has been statutorily required to undertake a review of the
accredited investor standard for natural persons every four years and make its own determination as
to whether the standard should be updated. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 413(b) (2010). While this provision only requires the SEC
to review the accredited investor standards that apply to natural persons, it illustrates the broad
discretion that the SEC has to enact changes to the accredited investor standard.
218. See, e.g., Lucia v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018) (striking down as
unconstitutional the SEC’s system of using in-house judges to decide conflicts); NASDAQ Stock
Market, LLC v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 961 F.3d 421 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (holding that the SEC does
not have authority to challenge the reasonableness of stock exchange fee rules using section 19(d)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934); N.Y. Stock Exch. LLC v. Sec. & Exch. Comm., 962 F.3d
541 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (invalidating a pilot program initiated by the SEC to study the market effects
of broker-dealer incentive programs).
219. See Bethany McLean, Too Big to Fail, COVID-19 Edition: How Private Equity is Winning
the
Coronavirus
Crisis,
VANITY
FAIR
(Apr.
9,
2020),
https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2020/04/how-private-equity-is-winning-the-coronavirus-crisis.
220. Many argue that the federal government has already subsidized the private equity industry
in significant ways. Most famously, the long-time taxation of carried interest profits by private

886

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 81:840

We got an initial look at the issue of federal bailouts in spring 2020,
when the federal government had to decide how to respond to the COVID19 crisis. To the surprise of some,221 the federal government did not allow
private equity-backed portfolio companies to gain access to PPP loans. As
various commentators have noted, however, the private equity industry did
receive certain indirect bailouts in other forms.222 Looking further back in
time, some have also argued that the federal response to the financial crisis
of 2008 also served as an indirect bailout of the private equity industry.223
equity managers has long been understood by most academics as a subsidy to private equity with
little substantive justification. See Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership Profits
in Private Equity Funds, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3–4, 59 (2008) (“By getting paid in part with carry
instead of cash, fund managers defer the tax on income derived from their human capital. Often,
they are able to convert the character of that income from ordinary income into long-term capital
gain, which is taxed at a lower rate. . . . The status quo treatment of a profits interest in a partnership
is no longer a tenable position to take as a matter of sound tax policy.” (footnotes omitted)); Thomas
J. Brennan & Karl S. Okamoto, Measuring the Tax Subsidy in Private Equity and Hedge Fund
Compensation, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 27 (2008). The extraordinarily long period of low interest rates
overseen by the Federal Reserve is often viewed as another form of subsidy to the private equity
industry. See McLean, supra note 219 (“[T]he era of low interest rates, which began with former
Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan and continues to this day, has been a huge boon to
private-equity firms.”).
221. See generally McLean, supra note 219.
222. One scholar has argued that even though private equity-owned portfolio companies were
excluded from receiving PPP loans, the private equity industry’s lobbying did not go unheard. The
private equity industry benefited greatly from the decision of federal policymakers to expand its
programs for buying corporate bonds and bond ETFs to include bonds and leveraged loans issued
by companies whose credit ratings had been downgraded to junk status since the pandemic’s
outbreak. This provided a lifeline to the junk bond market generally and helped to ensure that they
would continue to have access to cheap credit for new deals. See Arthur E. Wilmarth Jr., The
Pandemic Crisis Shows that the World Remains Trapped in a ‘Global Doom Loop’ of Financial
Instability, Rising Debt Levels, and Escalating Bailouts, 40 Banking & Fin. Serv. Pol’y Rep. No. 8,
at
39
(2021),
https://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2814&context=faculty_publications
(“Private equity firms and their allies aggressively lobbied the federal government to help their
endangered portfolio companies. . . . The Fed’s expansion of its corporate bond programs ‘provided
a lifeline to corporate debt rated below investment grade’ and ensured that private equity firms
would have ‘continued access to cheap credit for new deals.’ Many observers viewed the Fed’s
action as ‘an indirect bailout of the private equity industry.’” (quoting Joe Rennison et al., Federal
Reserve Enters New Territory with Support for Risky Debt, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2020),
https://www.ft.com/content/c0b78bc9-0ea8-461c-a5a2-89067ca94ea4));
see
also
David
Kocieniewski & Caleb Melby, Private Equity Lands Billion-Dollar Backdoor Hospital Bailout,
BLOOMBERG (June 2, 2020, 4:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2020-0602/private-equity-lands-billion-dollar-backdoor-hospital-bailout.
223. See, e.g., McLean, supra note 219 (“Infuriatingly enough, the financial crisis in 2008 might
even have saved private-equity firms from their sins. Never mind that they often overpaid for the
companies they acquired, and loaded them up with so much debt that ‘even a mild economic
downturn could make it nearly impossible for those companies to repay their loans,’ as Fortune
[Magazine] put it. Thanks to all the cheap money made available by the Fed, companies owned by
private-equity firms could simply refinance their debts at lower rates, thereby getting a fresh lease
on life.”).
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However one characterizes the 2020 response, the COVID-19 pandemic
recession turned out not to be a very good test case for the question of whether
the federal government will bail out the private equity industry in response
to an existential threat. While there was a short period of extreme uncertainty
at the start of the pandemic, the industry weathered the storm extraordinarily
well, with no discernible effect on investment returns.224 Most perceived
COVID-19 to be a temporary threat. Because private equity funds can avoid
short-term liquidity crunches thanks to locked-in capital, many
commentators anticipated at the very start of the pandemic that private equity
would even be able to benefit from COVID-19 and emerge in a strong
position.225
It is easy to imagine other market events, however, that would pose a
more serious and lasting threat to the private equity industry. Given the
enormous investment of public pension dollars into private equity funds,
there is a significant public interest in keeping private equity from failing.
Private equity managers are no doubt aware of this, raising the question
whether these realities have introduced moral hazard into the way that private
equity managers operate their businesses.
CONCLUSION
Large-scale investment in private equity funds by public pension plans
has had a profound impact on the private equity industry. Using the SEC’s
three-part mission as an analytical framework, this Article identifies
fundamental ways in which private equity has been shaped by public pension
plans over the years. As a result, while one can disagree with exactly how
the SEC has gone about intervening in private equity (and how it proposes to
increase its scope of intervention), increased SEC oversight of the industry
over the years and ongoing scrutiny of industry practices should not come as
a particular surprise. Large-scale public pension investment in private equity
has shaped how the private equity industry operates and increased the
public’s interest in what happens in this market.

224. See
MacArthur
et
al.,
supra
note
26,
at
3–4,
21,
https://www.bain.com/globalassets/noindex/2021/bain_report_2021-global-private-equityreport.pdf (“It was a year of massive disruption—and private equity emerged unscathed. . . . By all
indications, private equity weathered 2020’s perfect storm without taking a hit to returns.”).
225. See, e.g., Hugh Son, Alex Sherman & Lauren Hirsch, Private Equity Eyes Industries
Crippled by Coronavirus: ‘They Have Been Waiting For This,’ CNBC (Mar. 25, 2020, 2:29 PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/03/25/private-equity-eyes-coronavirus-hit-industries-theyve-beenwaiting.html (quoting the head of M&A at a major Wall Street firm as saying: “They have been
waiting for this type of market dislocation . . . . I don’t think they wanted something quite this bad,
but they did want a pullback in valuation”).

